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DOMBROWSKI IN THE WAKE OF YOUNGER:
THE VIEW FROM WITHOUT AND WITHINt
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris' and its com-
panion cases 2 has aroused in many lawyers the fear that federal
courts will no longer be available as forums for affirmative relief
from unconstitutional governmental activity violating first amend-
ment rights. In an earlier analysis, I contended that the Dom-
browski-type suit was an effective weapon for social change, in that
the availability of such relief in the federal courts redressed the
balance between those seeking to achieve social change and those
using their control of the organs of governmental power to resist
itA Since the clear thrust of the Younger cases was to restrict the
availability of this remedy, reevaluation of its effectiveness as an
instrument for social change is now necessary. I propose first to
review the Dombrowski-type suit as it had developed and was oper-
ating prior to Younger. Second, I will discuss my perception of the
practical significance of the Dombrowski-type suit. I shall then
try to determine exactly what the Supreme Court did in the
Younger cases, speculate on why it did so, and analyze the legal
issues in a Dombrowski-type suit as affected by Younger, suggest-
ing some answers and strategies. Finally, I will discuss the politi-
cal considerations regarding utilization of the Dombrowski-type
suit today.
My analysis comes both from without and from within-from an
academician attempting to be a "part-time movement lawyer," rep-
resenting individuals and groups seeking, through their legal strug-
t The invaluable assistance of Richard C. Rose, a third year student
in the University of Kentucky College of Law, is gratefully acknowledged.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959,
University of Pittsburgh.
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
216 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). The latter three cases
dealt with federal relief against state obscenity prosecutions. See note 71
infra. Injunctive relief against obscenity prosecutions does not usually
involve the "repression against social change" problem, and these cases will
not be considered except insofar as they may shed light on the availability
of the remedy in the repression context.
3. Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for So-
cial Change: Reflections From Without and Within (pts. 1-2), 18 KAn. L.
REv. 237, 629 (1970). See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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gles, to achieve social change. 4 In all candor, I cannot claim to be
either impartial or dispassionate; to the extent that these charac-
teristics are virtues, I regret their absence. Nevertheless, I am
willing to pay this cost, for I believe my own involvement has pro-
vided insights into the real life operations of the legal system that
would otherwise be unavailable.
II. THE DOMBROWSKI-TYPE SUIT PRIOR TO YOUNGER5
The Dombrowski-type suit, as understood by most federal courts
and legal commentators prior to Younger, permitted the federal
courts to grant injunctive and declaratory relief in either of two
circumstances: (1) against the enforcement of facially invalid laws
regulating or applicable to acts of expression; and (2) against im-
proper action by government officials designed to inhibit the ex-
ercise of first amendment rights.6 This included relief from pend-
ing state criminal prosecutions and from future enforcement,
through criminal prosecution or otherwise. Although the great
majority of cases involved attacks on state laws and pending or
threatened state prosecutions, actions against federal officials were
also permitted.7 Two distinct aspects to Dombrowski were gener-
ally recognized: the "void on its face" attack and "bad faith and
harassment" challenge. Under the first theory, a criminal prosecu-
tion under a law facially invalid due to vagueness or overbreadth
was deemed to have a chilling effect upon the exercise of first
amendment rights by the accused and others;9 therefore, remedy
by way of defense to that prosecution was inadequate to protect
those rights. 10 Likewise, where the prosecution was brought in bad
4. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 239.
5. For a more complete discussion of pre-Younger developments, see
id. at 238-50.
6. See id. at 238. See also Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935(W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illi-
nois, 292 F. Supp. 185, 189 (N.D. Ill. 1968); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 206-208 (2d ed. 1970); Maraist, Federal Injunctive
Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski,
48 TEXAS L. REV. 535, 567 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817(2d Cir. 1969). Dombrowski-type suits have not generally been brought to
enjoin pending federal prosecutions. But see McSurely v. McClellan, 426
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8. I originally referred to this as the "regulation of expression" aspect
of Dombrowski.
9. As to the relationship of the "void on its face" doctrine to the asser-
tion of the rights of third parties, see Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitu-
tional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 612-626 (1962).
For a criticism of the vagueness of the Court's opinion, see Maraist, supra
note 6, at 566-568.
10. A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression
usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves
may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms ...
When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is here alleged,
the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights
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faith for the purpose of inhibiting the exercise of first amendment
rights, the prosecution itself caused the injury." In either instance
"irreparable injury"1 2 was held to exist, thus authorizing both in-
junctive and declaratory relief.
The significance of Dombrowski, however, should not be misun-
derstood. 13 Despite the importance of the court's recognition that
bad faith and harassment constituted "irreparable injury," this
holding actually broke no new ground. It had long been recognized
that while "equity does not generally enjoin criminal prosecutions,
because there is an adequate remedy at law by way of defense to
such prosecutions,' 4 there are certain circumstances where this
remedy was not adequate. Injunctive relief against threatened and
even pending prosecutions was then justified.' 5 Perhaps the clear-
est of these cases-recognized in both the federal and state sys-
tems' 6-is when prosecution is part of a scheme of harassment de-
signed to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.
Dombrowski's breakthrough, therefore, was contained in the other
branch of "irreparable injury"-the facially vague or overbroad
statute. Recognizing a societal interest in avoidance of the chilling
effects incidental to the existence of facially unconstitutional stat-
utes, the court provided a liberal process for their invalidation. The
may be critical. For in such cases,, the statutes lend themselves too
readily to denial of those rights. The assumption that defense of a
criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of con-
stitutional rights is unfounded in such cases .... The chilling ef-
fect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from
the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its suc-
cess or failure.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
11. See id. at 488-89.
12. The term "irreparable injury" is another of those concepts developed
during the days of the separate administration of law and equity. To say
that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he will suffer "irreparable injury"
is merely the traditional way of saying that he must demonstrate the in-
adequacy of other remedies in order to be affirmatively entitled to equita-
ble relief.
13. See generally Sedler, supra note 3, at 244-45.
14. See, e.g., Ivy v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1965); Fairchild v.
Brock, 88 Cal. App. 2d 425, 199 P.2d 9 (1948); Cicchetti v. Anderson, 90
R.I. 76, 155 A.2d 64 (1959). See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQuiTY § 173 (2d ed. 1948).
15. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920 (1913);
City of Ashland v. Heck's Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966); Fairmont Foods
Co. v. City of Duluth, 261 Minn. 189, 111 N.W.2d 342 (1961); Huntworth
V. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915). See generally H. MCCLINTOCK,
supra note 14.
16. See Beeler v. Smith, 40 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Ky. 1941); Kenyon v.
City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). See also Denton v.
City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956). In such cases the remedy
by way of defense would have been inadequate, if for no other reason,
because the plaintiffs would have been subject to a "multiplicity of suits,"
a traditional ground for equitable relief. See Board of Comm'rs v. Orr,
181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920 (1913).
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injunctive remedy was a potent weapon for vindication of society's
interest in freedom of expression. Moreover, since in practice the
Dombrowski-type suit was available with respect to pending, as
well as threatened, prosecutions, 17 instances of federal interven-
tion into state proceedings clearly increased; 18 primary responsi-
bility for the protection of first amendment rights was thereby
placed on federal district judges.
Some courts, however, did not read Dombrowski as setting forth
alternative grounds of "irreparable injury" and thus required a
showing of bad faith enforcement before reaching the constitutional
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), the anti-injunction act, makes significant the
distinction between pending and threatened prosecutions. The section
provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments.
In Dombrowski, the act was irrelevant since the original charges had been
dismissed prior to the filing of the federal suit, and subsequent indict-
ments were obtained only after the federal suit had been erroneously dis-
missed by the district court. Since no prosecution was pending, the court
therefore left open the question of the impact of section 2283. In a subse-
quent case, Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 614 n.3 (1968), the issue was
again recognized but left unresolved. Lower federal courts, however, did
reach the issue. Most considered the Dombrowski-type suit to provide a
special circumstance justifying issuance of federal injunctive relief, despite
the apparent prohibition of the statute. See, e.g., Honey v. Goodman, 432
F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970); Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.
1969); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Wheeler v. Good-
man, 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
Other courts circumvented the problem by finding section 2283 inapplica-
ble to claims for declaratory relief, even if a prosecution was pending.
See, e.g., Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967). By ap-
proaching the question in this way, courts avoided deciding whether 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) constituted a statutorily authorized exception to sec-
tion 2283 in all cases. The Third Circuit, which continues to hold that
section 1983 is a statutorily authorized exception to section 2283 (De Vita
v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 [3d Cir. 1970J), held that in a Dombrowski-type suit,
injunctive relief was proper without regard to whether section 1983 was an
exception in all cases. Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d
Cir. 1969). Most circuits passing on the question in a non-Dombrowski
context have held that section 1983 was not a statutorily authorized excep-
tion. See Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964); Sexton
v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1956);
Smith v. Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957). See also Sedler,
supra note 3, at 251-52. This reasoning was used by a federal court in a
non-Dombrowski context to invalidate a state anti-abortion law, where it
admittedly could not enjoin the pending prosecution. Babbitz Y. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970). When
state officials proved recalcitrant, it issued an injunction, later vacated by
the Supreme Court in light of Younger. Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp.
219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 93 (1971). However, the contro-
versy in Wisconsin continues unabated. See Kennan v. Warren, 328 F.
Supp. 525 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
18. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 261-62.
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claim.19 But most considered the two aspects independently, al-
lowing attacks on the facial validity of a law without regard to bad
faith enforcement. 20  Cameron v. Johnson2 1 seemingly fortified
this interpretation. The plaintiffs challenged the Mississippi anti-
picketing law on its face and further alleged that state officials had
applied it in bad faith to harass them and discourage them from ex-
ercizing their first amendment rights.22 Only after the Court found
the law facially valid did it deal with the contention that "the rec-
ord disclosed sufficient irreparable injury to entitle [the plaintiffs]
to the injunction sought even if the statute is constitutional on its
face. '23  Considering this issue, the Court found the evidence of
bad faith enforcement insufficient.24 The crucial point is that the
Court apparently considered either facial invalidity or bad faith
enforcement to be a proper basis for a Dombrowski-type suit; the
Court's discussion of facial validity even though proof of bad faith
was lacking necessarily implied that absence of the latter was not
determinative.
After Cameron few skeptics remained; most courts and commen-
tators assumed that Dombrowski had set forth alternative grounds
for "irreparable injury" which would justify federal injunctive and
declaratory relief.25 When an action alleged both grounds, courts
adopted the Cameron analysis: facial invalidity was considered
first, and the claim of bad faith enforcement was discussed only
after the law was found valid on its face.26
III. THE IMPACT OF DOMBROWSKI: A POLITICAL THEsIs
Having generally been viewed in the context of its effect upon
federal-state relationships, the Dombrowski-type suit is often seen
19. See id. at 245.
20. See Stickgold, Variations on the Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister:
Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings Affecting First Amend-
ment Rights, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 369, 399-406.
21. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
22. The Court explicitly referred to the "two-pronged argument." Id.
at 615.
23. Id. at 618.
24. Id. at 619-22.
25. See note 6 supra. At the time the Court decided Cameron, it af-
firmed per curiam the denial of relief in two other cases: Brooks v. Briley,
391 U.S. 361 (1968); Zwicker v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353 (1968). See Maraist,
supra note 6, at 575-79; Sedler, supra note 3, at 245-46. They were not
interpreted as inconsistent with the alternative grounds of "irreparable in-
jury" approach, in effect, recognized in Cameron.
26. Sedler, supra note 3, at 246. Moreover, where the district court had
erroneously dismissed a Dombrowski-type suit, the court of appeals would
consider the facial validity of the law, and if it found the law to be fa-
cially invalid, would direct the lower court to grant appropriate relief.
See Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968). If the statute was
found facially valid, the court would remand for an evidentiary hearing
on the charge of bad faith enforcement. See Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d
333 (6th Cir. 1970).
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as imposing an affirmative responsibility upon the federal courts
to protect first amendment rights, even to the point of interfering
in state criminal prosecutions. 27  While recognizing its significance
in this regard, 28 I would nevertheless contend that the federalism
aspect of Dombrowski has been overemphasized. Instead, I believe
such suits must be analyzed primarily from a remedial-political29
perspective. Dombrowski means affirmative relief against govern-
mental repression as opposed to defensive relief obtained in a crim-
inal prosecution already instituted. If so perceived, the federal-
ism problems diminish in relative importance, for Dombrowski-type
relief is similarly appropriate to thwart repressive action by fed-
eral, as well as state, officials.30  My thesis is, therefore, that the
real significance of the Dombrowski-type suit relates to the impact
that the availability of this remedy has on the conflict between
those seeking to bring about social change and those using their
control of the organs of. governmental power to resist it.31
The criminal prosecution of social change advocates undoubtedly
does have a chilling effect upon their efforts. Defending against
a criminal prosecution can sap the already typically inadequate hu-
man and monetary resources so vital to any social change move-
ment. Moreover, by instituting prosecution, the government ac-
quires an important tactical advantage: a confrontation situation
is created in which social change advocates can be denounced as
"wrongdoers" or "subversives." Public opinion can thus be ma-
nipulated against the movement for social change; realistically, the
ultimate outcome of the prosecution may be irrelevant. By the
same token, the government can discourage others from initiating
or supporting social change efforts with its warning that, "This can
happen to you, too." Criminal prosecutions can then have a serious
adverse impact on social change effort-an impact of which the
government is fully awareY2
27. This has been the general tenor of the writings on the subject. See
Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions Which Abridge First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 67 (1967); Boyer,
Federal Injunctive Relief; A Counterpoise Against the Use of State Crimi-
nal Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional
Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51 (1967); Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal
Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights Cases-A New
Trend in Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34 FoRD. L. REV. 71 (1965);
Maraist, supra note 6; Strickgold, supra note 20.
28. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 253-55.
29. The term "political" is used in its broadest sense to refer primarily
to the impact of the availability of the Dombrowski-type suit on the rest
of society-those whom the advocates of social change are trying to influ-
ence.
30. See note 7 supra.
31. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 255-58.
32. This is particularly so when the government uses the conspiracy
charge. It can use the prosecution to demonstrate that social change
effort represents a "conspiracy," with all the emotive impact and sinister
meaning that charge connotes. The "Spock" and "Chicago Seven" con-
spiracy trials are prime examples.
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Where such a prosecution is pending, the Dombrowski-type suit
represents a counterattack; the otherwise hapless victims can them-
selves assume the political and psychological initiative. To the
extent that the suit is successful and prosecutions are aborted or
repressive laws invalidated, the government has been beaten.3 3 So-
cial change advocates will have been protected, repressive weap-
ons may have been removed from the government's arsenal, and
some of the chilling effect may have been eliminated.3 4 Thus, the
government's power to expose and deter is severely weakened.
Equally important, the mere availability of this remedy may have
independent political significance even if the litigation is unsuccess-
ful.3 5 By initiating a Dombrowski-type suit to enjoin future prose-
cutions or the enforcement of repressive laws, those threatened by
repressive governmental action can put the government itself on
trial and if combined with direct political action, social change advo-
cates might beat back or minimize the repressive effort. The Dom-
browski-type suit also gives the advocates of social change the op-
portunity to expose the real purpose behind the threatened govern-
mental action, and to obtain public support for their position.
The mystique of legal action can similarly inure to the benefit
of dissidents; regardless of its final result, the fact that a suit
has been filed implies some form of "wrongdoing" on the part
of the government. Furthermore, the government is being re-
sisted in the courts, and the legitimacy of its actions is being chal-
lenged.36 The contradictions between the officially-approved values
of freedom of expression and the right to dissent on the one hand,
and the government's repressive policies on the other, can be
brought into sharp focus.3 7 And at a minimum, it will be shown
that the government can be resisted, with that resistance taking
place against a backdrop of "law and the Constitution. '38  Like-
33. I illustrated this element by a detailed consideration "from within"
of McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967). Sedler, supra
note 3, at 631-39.
34. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 257-58.
35. Id. at 630, 640-49. I am not discounting the fact that the availability
of relief in a federal as opposed to a state forum can make a very real
difference. Id. at 253-55. However, I think it more important to empha-
size the difference between affirmative and defensive relief, particularly in
the political context.
36. As to "legitimizing democratic forms against the efforts of the rulers
to delegitimitize them," see the very provocative discussion in Kinoy,
The Role of the Radical Lawyer and Teacher of Law: Some Reflections,
29 GUILD PRACTITIONER 3, 11-12 (1970).
37. Regarding the role of the radical lawyer in resolving contradictions,
see id. at 9. As to "forcing the judge to face up to the contradictions" in
the context of protecting first amendment rights, see Sedler, Book Review,
80 YALE L.J. 1070, 1083-84 (1971).
38. Professor Kinoy uses "The Example of Havana Lawyer Fidel Castro"
to illustrate how the government can be resisted in the courts within a
revolutionary framework. Kinoy, supra note 36, at 12-17.
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wise, the filing of a suit arouses the "potential victims" by psycho-
logically providing an "umbrella of protection," which both en-
courages continuation of social change efforts and reduces possible
participant "fallout." 39 Finally, the threat of a Dombrowski-type
suit may in some cases cause government officials to hesitate before
acting against the advocates of social change. Hence, the avail-
ability of the Dombrowski-type suit provides not only a legal
weapon against repression, but an important "political-legal" one as
well.
IV. THE YOUNGER CASES
A. Younger in the Perspective of Protest
In tracing the development from Dombrowski to Younger, it is
important to discuss the changing nature of protest during the
years between 1965 and 1971 and to consider the possible impact
of this factor on the behavior of courts faced with Dombrowski-
type suits. 40 Four basic features characterize the pre-Dombrowski
era of dissent and social change effort: 41 (1) the protests were
generally restricted to a particular region of the country-the
South; (2) the objectives sought did not involve radical social
change, were in accord with the officially approved value of elimi-
nating racial discrimination,42 and emphasized primarily the re-
moval of state created or supported impediments to racial equality;
(3) the methods of protest were conventional and nonviolent;43 and
(4) the relevant state courts had proved unresponsive to pleas for
protection of federal rights, making federal intervention absolutely
necessary if civil rights activity was to continue free from severe
repression. 44
In retrospect, the choice for the Supreme Court in Dombrowski
was not particularly difficult. On one side were the officially ap-
proved values of racial equality and freedom of expression; on the
other was the comity principle, directing federal courts to avoid
interfering with state law enforcement and with the operations of
state courts.45 Judge Wisdom, dissenting when Dombrowski was
before the three-judge court, stated the issue precisely:
39. I illustrated this element by a detailed consideration "from within"
of the struggle against the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee.
Sedler, supra note 3, at 640-49.
40. See id. at 258-60.
41. Id.
42. Racial equality clearly continues to be an "officially-approved"
value, as evidenced by such recent decisions as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
43. But even here a protest could go "too far." See Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
44. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 253-54.
45. The comity principle is reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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The main issue is whether the State is abusing its legisla-
tive power and criminal processes: whether the State, un-
der the pretext of protecting itself against subversion, has
harassed and humiliated the plaintiffs and is about to prose-
cute them solely because their activities in promoting civil
rights for Negroes conflict with the State's steel-hard policy
of segregation. They ask the federal court to protect their
federally protected rights.46
The only obstacle to such intervention-the comity principle-was
further weakened by the state courts' own abdication of their re-
sponsibility to protect federal constitutional rights. If the Supreme
Court had any lingering doubts about the propriety of federal in-
tervention, they were likely tempered by the limited objectives
of the protest and the conventional means employed. While the
Court may have been aware of risks in opening the doors of the
federal courts, these considerations were counterbalanced by the
immediate need to protect civil rights activity in the South.
But by the very time Dombrowski was decided, the dimensions
of protest in this country were beginning to undergo profound
changes. Geographically, contemporary protest efforts have dis-
persed to virtually all areas of the country; conceptually, civil
rights groups are now demanding affirmative governmental action
to redress years of discrimination. Moreover, dissent and social
change efforts have become multifaceted, thereby acquiring a
broader base which is independent of race alone. And finally, the
methods of protest have changed; direct action and civil disobe-
dience 47 are considered legitimate tactics, and among some ele-
ments of the movement, the legitimacy extends to unrestrained
violence. 48 In sum, the protest movement of today is in many re-
spects the very opposite of the civil rights movement prior to
Dombrowski. At every juncture, political, economic, and social in-
stitutions are being challenged, from both the radical and-for
want of a better term-reformist perspectives.49
The intensity of the movement for social change has produced a
46. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 569 (E.D. La. 1964).
47. I use the term "civil disobedience" to refer to a deliberate violation
of law without regard to consequences, and distinguish it from a violation
of a law for the purpose of testing its constitutionality. In the political
context, of course, this distinction is not necessarily made.
48. Our society is by no means opposed to violence. It all depends on
who is being violent against whom. As veteran movement lawyer William
M. Kunstler has observed: "In terms of real violence to human beings, one
B-52 raid over South Vietnam makes it offensive to apply the word vio-
lence to what some of the more militant factions of the movement have
done." Playboy Interview: William Kunstler, PLAYBoY, Aug. 1970, at 232.
49. We are witnessing the "unprecedented and extraordinary growing
radicalization of vast numbers of Americans who are experiencing the in-
ability of the rulers to solve any of the immediate problems of the society."
Kinoy, supra note 36, at 7.
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repression of equal intensity by the "Establishment" 5 0-those admin-
istering the institutions of the society who are in a position to use
their institutional power to resist fundamental social change. The
shootings at Kent State and Jackson State, police raids on Black
Panther headquarters, the enactment of "antiriot" laws and "crime
control" bills, increased police surveillance and wiretapping, the
prosecutions of movement leaders, and the mass arrests of protestors,
all reflect an institutionalized effort to resist the movement for
sweeping social change.5'
This is then the context in which the Dombrowski-type suit had to
be viewed by the courts in the years after Dombrowski. If I am
correct in my contention that the Dombrowski-type suit represents
an important legal-political remedy for advocates of social change
in their conflict with the "Establishment," then negative response
by the courts to the changing nature of protest would not be sur-
prising.
My analysis of Younger further proceeds from the recognition of
what I believe to be a critical paradox underlying the relationship
between the first amendment and the struggle for social change.
52
Assurance of the "dissent and social change" function of the first
amendment-as distinguished from its "public information" and
"individual self-fulfillment" functions 5 3-mandates broad protec-
tion for all expression, assembly, and petition. The antithesis of
this function-repression-is itself a functionally active concept and
will therefore emanate from the legislative and executive branches.
Under our system, the burden then falls on the reactive (in an
emphatically nonpolitical sense) branch of the government-the
judiciary-to guarantee these fundamental rights.54 But the courts
as institutions cannot be divorced from the individual decision-
makers occupying the positions of power within the judiciary.
50. I use the concept of "Establishment" as a loose term representing
a combination of power and attitude: power in the sense of "the people
who are running things" and attitude in the sense of an essential satisfac-
tion with the status quo and resistance to fundamental political, economic,
or social change. Those who have the "Establishment" attitude, but not
the power, can best be considered as "supporters of the Establishment," or
what President Nixon and Time Magazine have called the "silent ma-
jority."
51. In Professor Kinoy's view, "We are in a transition period in which
the dominant sections of the ruling powers are edging toward a substitu-
tion of the present form of rule by the capitalist class-the form of rule
classically known as bourgeois democracy-by another form of rule-the
open terrorist dictatorship, classically known as fascism." Kinoy, supra
note 36, at 6. For the "establishment liberal" view that repression is a
figment of the New Left's imagination, see Goodman, The Question of Re-
pression, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1970, at 23.
52. See also Sedler, supra note 37, at 1079-82.
53. Id. at 1079-80.
54. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13-14
(1970).
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Generally, these men are themselves so totally integrated into the
"Establishment"5 5 that they will presumptively be inhospitable to
the claims of social change advocates. 56 Thus, protection-in-fact of
dissent and social change effort by the judiciary cannot be assumed.
The changing nature of protest in the post-Dombrowski years
has dramatically changed the frame of reference in which the
courts are considering the Dombrowski-type suit. Becauses judges
are now being asked to protect dissent and social change effort di-
rected toward radically altering the present political, social, and
economic system, far more motivation to deny such protection is
inevitable. This motivation is reinforced by the changing methods
of protest; greater emphasis on direct action and civil disobedience
means that protest often involves so-called "hard core" conduct
which, as such, is not entitled to first amendment protection. The
presence of "hard core" conduct is significant because it enables
judges to avoid facing the contradiction between officially approved
societal values reflected in the first amendment which guarantee
the right to dissent and work for social change, and their own
motivation, conscious or unconscious, to refuse such protection
where efforts at sweeping and fundamental social change are in-
volved.57 Thus, the "hard core" nature of the conduct introduces
an element that legitimatizes a decision to deny protection;5 8 while
speech will be protected, violence or civil disobedience will not.
The objectives of the protest theoretically have had nothing at all
to do with the decision to deny protection. In sum, in the years
following Dombrowski, situational counterpressures arguing for
limiting the availability of affirmative relief have emerged and,
correspondingly, been reflected in judicial decisions 5 9-
Another counterpressure militating towards restricting Dom-
browski may have resulted from the sheer number of Dombrowski-
type suits being filed, for part of the "federal judicial ethos" is
that federal courts are being overburdened by civil rights actions.
It has always seemed paradoxical to me that federal judges are so
concerned about this supposedly large number of civil rights
suits, 60 while accepting without question the diversity of citizenship
55. Federal judges are not subject to the same direct political pressures
after they are appointed as are their state counterparts. But they are
still a part of the local "Establishment" and are subject to what I have
called "the cocktail party syndrome." See Sedler, supra note 3, at 254-55.
56. See Sedler, supra note 37, at 1081-83. For a discussion of the prob-
lems that this paradox presents and how the movement lawyer must deal
with them, see text accompanying note 329 infra.
57. See text accompanying notes 329-332 infra.
58. Conversely, the failure of southern courts to protect first amend-
ment rights at the time of Dombrowski "tipped" the balance in favor of
federal intervention.
59. See the discussion of Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), in
Sedler, supra note 3, at 267-69.
60. As to just how "burdened" the federal courts are because of "civil
rights" suits, see Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV.
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cases, which make up a substantial portion of the civil litigation in
the federal courts"' and in which the federal court plays the role of
the "ventriloquist's dummy. '6 2 The primary responsibility of the
federal courts should be the protection of federal rights under
their "arising under-federal question" jurisdiction, with diversity
cases of decidedly secondary importance. Yet in practice the fed-
eral judge is more comfortable with a diversity suit, where he is
essentially deciding a "wealth issue"65 between private persons or
enterprises. 64 The hostility of federal judges to civil rights cases
may then be explained both by the controversial nature of these
cases65 and by the fact, suggested above, that in such cases the
judge is frequently asked to protect social change effort directed
against the very system of which he is an integral part. The over-
burdening factor, coupled with an understandable reluctance on
the part of federal judges to appear to be "putting down" their
state court brethren by interfering with state proceedings, must
also be taken into account in assessing the behavior of the courts
when dealing with Dombrowski-type suits.
So long as the "void on its face" branch of Dombrowski was
retained, the Dombrowski-type suit continued to be an important
political-legal weapon for advocates of social change in their ef-
forts to resist governmental repression. This statement, of course,
is from the perspective of one committed to the movement for
sweeping social change; from another perspective, it could be ar-
gued that the Dombrowski-type suit was being used not only to pro-
tect "legitimate" protest activities, but also to enable "hard core
revolutionaries" to avoid "just punishment" for constitutionally
unprotected conduct.66 Moreover, its availability meant that fed-
L. REv. 1352, 1354-55 (1970). As of June 30, 1970, there were 93,207 civil
cases pending in federal courts, of which 3,616 were classified as civil
rights cases. DIRECTOR OF THE AD. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT, 1970, at 326-27, table X 2 (1971).
61. Of the civil cases referred to in note 60 supra, 31,557 were based
solely on diversity of citizenship. Of these, 9,874 involved automobile acci-
dents, and another 9,867 involved other personal injury claims. ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 60, at 327, table X 2.
62. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
63. While the present social-economic-political system has brought to
power persons whose values are likely to be wealth oriented and essen-
tially conservative, I do not think that the attitude toward dissent and
social change would necessarily be different if a "peaceful revolution"
were to take place and the reins of power were transferred to those whose
values are socialistic and radical. See Sedler, supra note 37, at 1082.
64. I view automobile accident cases as involving "wealth issues," even
though many of the plaintiffs in such actions are lower income persons.
Because of our fault system of tort liability, they have a chance to obtain
"instant wealth."
65. As I stated earlier, the federal judge is part of the local community
and is subject to the "cocktail party syndrome." He is subject to the
charge of "betrayal" if he upholds federal constitutional rights to lend sup-
port to an "unpopular cause." See note 55 supra.
66. See Wright v. City of Montgomery, 282 F. Supp. 291, 296 (M.D. Ala.
1968), aff'd., 406 F.2d 867 (1969).
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eral courts were increasingly being asked to interfere with the or-
derly processes of the state courts and that they would continue
to be overburdened by civil rights suits. 67
The context in which the Supreme Court decided the Younger
cases was then a very different one from that in which it decided
Dombrowski, and its decisions must be analyzed from that per-
spective.
B. Younger and the Law
On February 23, 1971, the Supreme Court decided six cases deal-
ing with the Dombrowski-type suit. The main case, Younger v.
Harris,6 8 and related cases, Samuels v. MackelU69 and Boyle v.
Landry,70 are germane to this discussion.71 Since some of the cases
were argued two and even three times 7 2 it is clear that the Supreme
Court made a fundamental policy judgment. With only Justice
Douglas dissenting, 73 the Court struck the balance in favor of re-
stricting the availability of the Dombrowski remedy._
Essentially, Younger held that the facial invalidity of the law
under which a state criminal prosecution had been instituted no
longer provided a basis for federal intervention in that proceed-
ing. Thus, the "void on its face" aspect of Dombrowski as applied
to pending state prosecutions was eliminated. The Court also held
that a bare allegation of chilling effect due to facial invalidity even
if true would not, in and of itself, constitute "irreparable injury,"
67. As Professor Charles Wright bitingly observed in commenting on the
prospective decisions in the Younger cases:
It is to be hoped that the decision in these cases will clarify the
meaning of Dombrowski and will establish that every person prose-
cuted under state law for conduct arguably protected by the First
Amendment cannot, by murmuring the words "chilling effect," halt
the state prosecution while a federal court, ordinarily of threejudges, passes on the validity of the statute and the bona fides of the
state law enforcement officers.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 208.
68. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
69. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
70. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
71. The three other cases involved federal intervention in state obscenity
prosecutions and therefore are not particularly relevant to our discussion.
In Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
216 (1971), the Court held that federal courts could not interfere with
pending state obscenity prosecutions on the ground that the underlying stat-
utes were facially invalid. In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), the
Court held improper a federal court order that materials seized for use
in pending state prosecutions be returned because of the failure of the state
to provide for a prior adversary judicial determination of obscenity. In
both instances such relief had become "standard practice." See, e.g., Cam-
bist Films Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
72. Younger and Samuels were argued three times; Boyle, Dyson, and
Byrne were argued twice.
73. He wrote a single dissent to both Younger and Boyle, but concurred
in Samuels.
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so as to entitle the plaintiffs to relief against future enforcement.7 4
Younger involved an attempt to enjoin prosecution under the
California criminal syndicalism law.75 The plaintiff alleged facial
unconstitutionality and that "the prosecution and even the presence
of the act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech
and press, rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment. ' 76 There
was no allegation that the prosecution "was brought in bad faith
or is only one in a series of repeated prosecutions to which he will
be subjected. '77 The conduct forming the basis of the criminal
charge-leaflet distribution-constituted "pure speech" under any
criteria.78 The three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional,
as it clearly was, 79 and enjoined the pending prosecution. The
prosecutor appealed.
The Court began by alluding to the "longstanding public policy
against federal interference with state court proceedings,"80 as re-
flected in the anti-injunction act,8 ' and observed that even "irrep-
arable injury," the traditional prerequisite for injunctive relief,
was insufficient to justify federal intervention unless that injury
was also "great and immediate. '8 2 The Court did not elaborate on
this distinction, except to say that "the threat to plaintiff's fed-
erally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by
his defense against a single criminal prosecution."'8 Thus, the
set 4 with which the Court approached the question was one de-
signed to preclude the granting of federal injunctive relief in all
but "exceptional circumstances. '8 5
74. This was the only issue in Boyle.
75. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1970). This was the stat-
ute that was upheld in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
76. 401 U.S. at 39.
77. Id. at 49. The obvious unconstitutionality of the law may have
made the "bad faith" attack seem unnecessary.
78. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent, "Harris' crime was
distributing leaflets advocating change in industrial ownership through
political action." 401 U.S. at 60. Justice Douglas also pointed out that
Harris tried unsuccessfully to have the state court dismiss on constitutional
grounds and also tried unsuccessfully to obtain a writ of prohibition from
the state appellate court.
79. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), where the Court ex-
pressly overruled Whitney.
80. 401 U.S. at 43.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
82. 401 U.S. at 46.
83. Id. It may be queried whether this concept is any different from
that of "inadequacy of other remedies," the traditional test of "irreparable
injury." See note 12 supra.
84. A set may be defined as a readiness to make a specified response to
a specified stimulus, so that when the stimulus is received, certain re-
sponses are selected from the repertoire of available responses rather than
others. D. JOHNSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT AND JUDGMENT 65
(1955). The stimulus "injunction against pending state court proceedings"
produced the response "only in exceptional circumstances."
85. See 401 U.S. at 46-48.
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Those circumstances, said the Court were present in Dombrow-
ski,8 6 where the complaint alleged "a plan to employ arrests, seiz-
ures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass
the plaintiffs and discourage them and their supporters from as-
serting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of
Negro citizens of Louisiana," and further that "the threats to en-
force the statute were not made with any expectation of securing
a valid conviction. 's7 The Court then referred to the raids on the
office, the seizure of files, the absence of probable cause for the
arrest warrants,8 8 the intention of the prosecutor to initiate new
prosecutions, and the public hearings at which photostatic copies of
the illegally-seized documents had been displayed. These circum-
stances, in the Court's view, "sufficiently established the kind of
irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the de-
fense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had always
been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention."8 9
The Supreme Court then proceeded to lay to rest the "void on its
face" aspect of Dombrowski once and for all. It observed that
the district court
thought that the Dombrowski decision substantially broad-
ened the availability of injunctions against state criminal
prosecutions and that under that decision the federal courts
may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing of
bad faith or harassment, wlhenever a state statute is found
"on its face" to be vague or overly broad, in violation of the
First Amendment.90
Although admitting that "some statements in the Dombrowski opin-
86. Id. at 48.
87. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), quoted in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48 (1971).
88. Dombrowski and the other plaintiffs moved for a preliminary hearing
in the state court, at which time the judge found that the police had not
produced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of criminal
conspiracy. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 240.
89. 401 U.S. at 48. If this were the only basis for Dombrowski, one
ought wonder why the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the substan-
tive constitutional question, since the allegations of the complaint had
never been proven at any evidentiary hearing. The three-judge court had
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and for this reason, the plaintiffs had not been given an
opportunity to prove their allegations of bad faith and harassment. See
Sedler, supra note 3, at 241. After holding that the complaint stated an
actionable claim, the Court should have remanded for an evidentiary
hearing, if fact questions would affect the decision to grant relief. Instead,
it declared the statutes unconstitutional on their face and remanded the
case with directions to issue injunctive relief. Be that as it may, the
Court now said that Dombrowski was a case where "the plaintiffs had
alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established standards."
401 U.S. at 50.
90. 401 U.S. at 50. So did everyone else. See note 6 supra.
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ion would seem to support this argument,"91 the Court discounted
them as unnecessary to the decision because the plaintiffs had
"alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established
standards. '92 In any event, the Court was unwilling to find the
concept of chilling effect "sufficient to justify such a substantial
departure from the established doctrines regarding the availability
of injunctive relief."9 3 Moreover, the Court suggested that "the
existence of a 'chilling effect,' even in the area of First Amendment
rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself,
for prohibiting state action. '9 4 It analogized to statutes regulating
a subject within the state's power, which do not directly abridge
free expression, but incidentally inhibit the exercise of first amend-
ment rights. Observing that such statutes could be upheld as con-
stitutional, the Court remarked:
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes
does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the
chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very ex-
istence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself
justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the impor-
tant and necessary task of enforcing those laws against
socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good
faith to be punishable under its laws and Constitution.9"
In holding that injunctive relief was not justified on the basis
of chilling effect alone, the Court further noted that this effect
would not necessarily be eliminated by the grant of relief, since
state officials could obtain an acceptable limiting construction of
the law in the state courts. 96 They could then prosecute conduct
occurring before the narrowing construction was made in the ab-
sence of "fair warning" problems. The chilling effect could be elim-
inated completely only if all prosecutions for conduct occurring
prior to the satisfactory rewriting were enjoined. But, said the
Court,
the States would then be stripped of all power to prosecute
even the socially dangerous and constitutionally unpro-
tected conduct that had been covered by the statute, until
a new statute could be passed by the state legislature and
approved by the federal courts in potentially lengthy trial
and appellate proceedings.9 7 '1
Next, the Court took a swipe at the process of testing a law on
its face in a Dombrowski-type suit, commenting that this practice
91. 401 U.S. at 50.
92. Id. This ignored, of course, the fact that the Dombrowski plaintiffs
had not proved those allegations. See note 89 supra.
93. 401 U.S. at 50.
94. Id. at 51.
95. Id. at 51-52.
96. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965); Sedler, supra
note 3, at 249-50.
97. 401 U.S. at 51.
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bordered on having the federal courts render advisory opinions. It
then concluded:
[W] e hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be re-
garded as having upset the settled doctrines that have al-
ways confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive
relief against state criminal prosecutions. We do not think
that opinion stands for the proposition that a federal court
can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on the
basis of a showing that the statute "on its face" abridges
First Amendment rights s8
Since the Court found "an absence of the factors necessary under
equitable principles to justify federal intervention,"99 it again
avoided deciding whether section 2283 barred federal relief against
pending state court prosecutions. 10 0
The Court's only concession was its observation that, "[t]here
may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the neces-
sary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the
usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.'' 101 As an example,
the Court suggested that a statute " 'might be flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it.' ".102 It did not
elaborate on other possible situations, nor did it consider whether
the California criminal syndicalism law satisfied that criteria. 0
Only Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the "void on its
face" aspect of Dombrowski should be retained:
The eternal temptation, of course, has been to arrest the
speaker rather than to correct the conditionsi about which
he complains. I see no reason why these appellees should
be made to walk the treacherous grounds of these statutes.
They, like other citizens, need the umbrella of the First
Amendment as they study, analyze, discuss, and debate the
troubles of these days. When criminal prosecutions can be
leveled against them because they express unpopular views,
the society of the dialogue is in danger. 0 4
He also adopted the position that title 42, section 1983 of the United
States Code was an expressly authorized exception to section 2283,
98. Id. at 53.
99. Id. at 54.
100. See note 17 supra.
101. 401 U.S. at 53.
102. Id. at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
103. Its unconstitutionality would seem clear in light of Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Indeed, it may be queried whether when the
unconstitutionality of a law in light of prior decisions is so clear as to
make any contention that it is not "plainly insubstantial," for purposes of
the convention of a three-judge court (Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31
[1962]; Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 [1962]), it is also "patently
and flagrantly" unconstitutional for Dombrowski purposes.
104. 401 U.S. at 65.
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thereby permitting federal courts to enjoin pending state prosecu-
tions where federal constitutional rights were involved.
Samuels v. Mackell'0 5 involved the same legal issues as Younger,
except that the plaintiffs sought declaratory as well as injunctive
relief. The Court held that where a state criminal proceeding was
pending, the same standards should govern the propriety of either
form of relief.10 It noted that a declaratory judgment issued
under such circumstances might serve as the basis for a subsequent
injunction against those proceedings "to 'protect or effectuate' the
declaratory judgment."'1 7 Furthermore, the Court contended that
the declaratory judgment, even if not used as the actual basis for
issuing an injunction, "has virtually the same practical effect as a
formal injunction would.' 0 8
In Boyle v. Landry,10 9 the Court held that allegations of "chilling
effect" were alone insufficient to justify relief against future en-
forcement of allegedly invalid laws. The Court took a similar po-
sition in Younger when it dismissed the challenges of third parties
who alleged that the prosecution of Harris created a chilling effect
upon their exercise of first amendment rights. 110 But in Younger,
the plaintiffs alleged a chilling effect solely on the basis of the
pending prosecution against Harris and the existence of the law
itself. In Boyle, however, much more governmental action had al-
legedly occurred, and only by taking the particular statute in isola-
tion could the court find that the plaintiffs were proceeding solely
on the basis of a mere statutory chilling effect. The plaintiffs,
black residents of Chicago, had originally challenged the Illinois
mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated bat-
tery, and intimidation statutes. The complaint alleged that some
of the plaintiffs had been arrested under some of the statutes and
that blacks were being intimidated in the exercise of their first
amendment rights through the wholesale use of all the statutes to
prosecute them and through the use of arrests without probable
cause, coupled with the setting of exorbitant bail. The three-judge
court convened to hear the case upheld all of the statutes except
one subsection of the mob action statute and one subsection of the
intimidation statute,"' enjoining enforcement of those portions of
105. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
106. The Court analogized to federal interference with state tax collec-
tions. Id. at 73. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319
U.S. 293 (1943).
107. 401 U.S. at 72. This occurred with respect to the relief against the
enforcement of the Wisconsin anti-abortion law. See note 17 supra.
108. 401 U.S. at 72. This will be true unless the state officials choose
to ignore the federal ruling and force a test in the state courts, as in
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400
U.S. 1 (1970).
109. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
110. 401 U.S. at 42.
111. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd sub nom.,
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971). For other aspects of the litigation not
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the statutes declared invalid. The defendants did not appeal from
the decision regarding the mob action statute; therefore the only
issue before the Supreme Court involved the intimidation statute.
The Court noted that none of the plaintiffs had ever been prose-
cuted, or even been specifically threatened with prosecution, under
the intimidation statute. Thus, it surmised that "those who origi-
nally brought this suit made a search of state statutes and city
ordinances with a view to picking out certain ones that they
thought might possibly be used by the authorities as devices for
bad-faith prosecutions against them."' 1 2  The Court concluded
testily:
There is nothing contained in the allegations of the com-
plaint from which one could infer that any one or more of
the citizens who brought this suit is in any jeopardy of suf-
fering irreparable injury if the State is left free to prosecute
under the intimidation statute in the normal manner. As
our holdings today in Younger v. Harris .. .and Samuels
v. Mackel . .. show, the normal course of state criminal
prosecutions cannot be disrupted or blocked on the basis of
charges which in the last analysis amount to nothing more
than speculation about the future. The policy of a century
and a half against interference by the federal courts With
state law enforcement is not to be set aside on such flimsy
allegations as those relied upon here."3
Justice Douglas, dissenting, viewed the question in a sharply
contrasting light. Looking to the total situation alleged in the
complaint, he commented:
Landry and his associates, however, allege that appellants
were using the intimidation section along with several other
sections to harass them, not to prosecute them in the normal
manner. They allege that appellants are arresting them
without warrants or probable cause, and detaining them on
excessive bail. They allege that the arrests are made dur-
ing peaceful demonstrations without any expectation of se-
curing valid convictions. In sum, Landry and his group
allege that the "intimidation" section is one of several
statutes which appellants are using en masse as part of a
plan to harass them and discourage their exercise of their
First Amendment rights. There is thus a lively and existing
case or controversy concerning First Amendment rights.
And I believe that the federal court acted in our finest
tradition when it issued the stay." 4
before the Supreme Court, see Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200 (1968);
Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 194 (1968); Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp.
189 (1968); Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 183 (1968); Landry v. Daley,
280 F. Supp. 968 (1968).
112. 401 U.S. at 81. These remarks echo those made earlier in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
113. 401 U.S. at 81.
114. Id. at 64. For a discussion of Boyle in the context of relief against
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Plainly, the rest of the Court did not see it that way.
In assessing the impact of Younger and Samuels, it must first
be remembered that these cases dealt only with federal relief
against pending state criminal prosecutions.1 " The Court was care-
ful to "express no view about the circumstances in which federal
courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts
at the time the federal proceeding is begun."" 6  But when pro-
ceedings are pending-the time at which the counterattack element
of Dombrowski must be brought into play-the Court took a very
restrictive view, eliminating the "void on its face" aspect of Dom-
browski, with respect to both injunctive and declaratory relief.
While retaining the "bad faith and harassment" aspect, the Court
nevertheless, left itself the option of holding that section 2283
barred relief even in those circumstances. There can, therefore, be
no doubt that by removing a very important part of the Dombrowski
remedy, the Court altered the balance against the advocates of so-
cial change.
Judging by the language in the opinions, concern with "hard
core" conduct was a significant and conscious factor in causing the
Court to take the turn that it did. For example, the plaintiffs in
Samuels'"7 challenged the constitutionality of the New York crim-
inal anarchy law on its face; but as Justice Douglas pointed out in
his concurrence:
[W] hile some of the counts embrace only advocacy or acts
which fall within its penumbra, still others are in the field
of activities far removed from the protection of the First
Amendment. There is a question concerning some of the
overt acts . . . . But other overt acts relate to the acqui-
sition of weapons, gunpowder, and the like, and the storing
of gasoline to start fires. Persuasion by such means plainly
has no First Amendment protection." 8
Samuels then starkly presented the Court with the consequences of
allowing unrestricted use of the "void on its face" doctrine to en-
join pending criminal prosecutions: "hard core revolutionaries,"
allegedly trying to "overthrow the system by force and violence"
might invoke the "void on its face" doctrine in the federal courts to
enjoin a state prosecution on first amendment grounds. While sev-
future prosecutions and enforcement of unconstitutional laws, see Section
V-B infra.
115. Federal relief by way of removal of the prosecution from the state
court is also very limited. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966);
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). See also id. at 54
(Stewart & Harlan, JJ., concurring).
117. The factual situation was the same in Fernandez.
118. 401 U.S. at 75. The lower court had held that in view of the nature
of plaintiffs' "hard core" conduct, they could not contend that the narrow-
ing interpretation of the statute by the state courts subsequent to the acts
for which they were charged failed to give them fair notice.
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eral of the plaintiffs were being prosecuted under other laws, it is
not difficult to imagine the Court asking, "What if the only law
that could be used was the criminal anarchy law?"
Unlike Younger, a leafletting case, Samuels clearly involved
"hard core" conduct, and it is reasonable to assume that the Court
decided Younger with Samuels in mind. Indeed, Justice Black's
majority opinion in Younger often seems more apropos to the Sam-
uels facts.119
Justice Douglas, on the other hand, distinguished the two cases
since it could not "be said that the cases against Samuels and
Fernandez are palpably unconstitutional.' 120 This being so, it was
for the state courts to preserve the first amendment rights, if any,
that might be involved, by "sifting out the chaff from the charges
through motions to strike, instructions to the jury, and other pro-
cedural devices .. ".. 121 Certainly, concluded Justice Douglas,
"violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the use of
weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally mas-
querade under the guise of 'advocacy.' -122 The other members of
the Court, however, were unwilling to draw this line and demanded
proof of bad faith enforcement as the minimum standard for fed-
eral intervention.
Nothing in any of the opinions indicates that the "burden on the
federal courts" was a significant factor in the Court's decisions.
Yet, it is difficult to believe that the Court was not influenced by
the large number of Dombrowski-type suits being brought, 23 and
perhaps it hoped that limiting the legal basis for such suits would
encourage movement lawyers to be more selective in their use of
this remedy. Unless selectivity does indeed develop, the burden
may remain substantially unchanged, with plaintiffs merely sub-
stituting an allegation of bad faith enforcement and harassment
for that of facial invalidity.
If law is a "prediction of what courts will do in fact,'1 24 what,
may it be asked, was the message that the Court was trying to
convey in Younger? In terms of effect, the Court clearly read-
justed the balance, altered in Dombrowski, between the advocates
of social change and the government. This suggests the desirability
of trying to analyze the future development of the Dombrowski-
type suit with reference to "adjusting and readjusting the bal-
ance."
119. See text accompanying notes 95, 97 supra.
120. 401 U.S. at 75.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The "burden" is magnified because of the fact that in a number of
these cases statutory three-judge courts are required. See notes 339-349
infra and accompanying text.
124. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
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In Dombrowski, the Court came down strong on the side of pro-
tecting dissent and social change effort against repressive govern-
mental action, even at the price of interfering with the operation
of the state courts. A justification for that decision was the failure
of southern state courts to protect even minimally the first amend-
ment rights of advocates of racial equality. By the time of Cam-
eron v. Johnson,2 5 the Court felt it necessary to readjust the bal-
ance somewhat. The changing nature of the objectives and meth-
ods of protest, the movement for fundamental and sweeping so-
cial change, and the presence of "hard core" conduct motivated the
Court to impose restraints on the Dombrowski remedy. By placing
a difficult burden on plaintiffs alleging bad faith and harassment
the Court in effect told the government: "So long as you proceed
under facially valid laws, we will not allow the federal courts to
interfere unless you really harass people and try to prevent dissent
entirely. You must be free to get at 'hard core' conduct, and at this
time, that is more important to us than is the protection of dissent
and social change effort-particularly since there is now a move-
ment afoot for such sweeping and fundamental social change." In
Younger, the Court, apparently after a great deal of soulsearching
-it is not common for cases to be argued three timesi 2 6 -tipped
the balance even further and removed the "void on its face"
weapon, which it saw as potentially being used to shield "hard
core" conduct. It may also have hoped to discourage what it con-
sidered to be excessive use of the Dombrowski-type suit, thereby
reducing the "burden" on the federal courts.
At the same time, the Court indicated methods by which to read-
just the balance again in either direction: by retaining the "bad
faith and harassment" aspect of Dombrowski and by again side-
stepping the "2283 problem," the federal courts were authorized
to grant relief in cases where there was demonstrable interference
with the exercise of first amendment rights and where the persons
claiming such rights had not engaged in "hard core" conduct.1 27
Thus, when read in light of Dombrowski, Younger may also con-
tain a subliminal warning to the government: "Ease up on the
repression and limit yourself to punishing 'hard core' conduct."
Similarly, the Court may be saying to the state court judges: "You
now have the major responsibility for protecting federal constitu-
tional rights, and like federal judges, you must go against your
seeming self-interest to protect the right to dissent and work for
social change." In the event that either default, the Supreme
Court can readjust the balance and broaden access to the federal
125. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
126. See note 72 supra.
127. Where "hard core" conduct is shown, it is not possible to assert a
claim of bad faith enforcement, since the state would have "probable
cause" to undertake the prosecution. See Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp.
183 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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courts by liberalizing the requirements for showing bad faith, ex-
tending the concept of "other irreparable injury," finding laws to
be "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional," or even reinstating
the "void on its face" aspect of Dombrowski.1 28  On the other
hand, there is a message for movement lawyers as well: "If you
burden the courts with baseless Dombrowski-type suits; if you try
to allege bad faith when the state is proceeding against 'hard core
conduct'; or if you are not more selective in your use of the Dom-
browski-type suit than you have been in the past, we will hold
that section 2283 is a complete bar to federal relief against pending
state prosecutions in all circumstances.' 1 29
The above analysis is obviously speculative and may be based
on completely unfounded premises. Nonetheless, it illustrates the
kind of behavioral analysis that I believe must be made if the
Dombrowski-type suit is to continue to be a viable and effective
weapon against repression. In this context, we may now consider
the legal problems in a Dombrowski-type suit today.
V. DOMBROWSKI AFTER YOUNGER: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. Relief Against Pending State Criminal Prosecutions
As noted above with respect to pending prosecutions, Younger
eliminated the "void on its face" aspect of Dombrowski, but left
intact the "bad faith and harassment" aspect. The effect of this
decision is aptly illustrated by reconsideration of Baker v. Bind-
ner.130 Suit was brought by open-housing advocates to enjoin
their prosecution under various state and local laws for incidents
arising out of their demonstrations. The arrests resulted from con-
frontations between the demonstrators and hecklers and from the
efforts of the police to prevent physical conflict. As usually hap-
pens in such situations, the police arrested the demonstrators. In
federal court, the plaintiffs alleged both facial invalidity and bad
faith harassment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court
found that the police had not acted in bad faith, observing that
"[t] he enforcement activity in these circumstances does not appear
to us to have been dedicated to a halting of the demonstrations, but
rather to a separation of the adversaries and to the protection of
all concerned, including the general public.' 1 3 1 Certainly, under
the subsequently ennunciated Cameron criteria, the court was cor-
128. Unsatisfactory experience with the results of Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), for example, had a good deal to do with the decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See particularly id. at 349
(Harlan, J., concurring).
129. While Younger and the other cases under discussion dealt only with
Dombrowski-type suits against pending state criminal proceedings, I would
submit that the same "adjusting and readjusting" can occur with respect to
relief against future prosecutions and enforcement of unconstitutional laws.
130. 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
131. Id. at 660.
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rect in its conclusion that bad faith had not been shown. But, ap-
plying the "void on its face" aspect of Dombrowski, the Court
stated:
Thus it is apparent that, in the judgment of this Court,
the plaintiffs, in all fairness and practicality, have no legiti-
mate complaint in this situation could we but find that all
of the ordinances and statutes affecting freedom of expres-
sion in this litigation were constitutional. This we are
unable to do as we find certain of them vague and over-
broad, and of possible sweeping application.13 2
It then proceeded to invalidate state criminal syndicalism, conspir-
acy, and vagrancy statutes, and city disorderly conduct, loitering,
and parade permit ordinances. Under Younger, however, dismissal
would be mandated, since the plaintiffs had "failed to show injury
above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single prose-
cution brought in good faith.'
11
33
Younger would likewise require a different result in a number
of other cases where the court took jurisdiction 34 on the basis of
an allegation of facial invalidity without regard to bad faith en-
forcement and, after finding the challenged law invalid on its face,
issued injunctive or declaratory relief.135 Thus, in cases where the
district court had granted relief on this basis, appellate courts after
Younger have reversed and ordered dismissal. 13 6  Dismissals are
also routinely ordered now in district court cases where bad faith
enforcement is not alleged. 13
7
On the other hand, several pre-Younger decisions were based on
a finding of bad faith enforcement, and these cases will now be
particularly important precedents. Often the success of the bad
faith challenge appeared to rest on a showing of obvious harass-
ment.13  In NAACP v. Thompson,139 for example, mass arrests oc-
curred, movement leaders had been detained in temporary jail facil-
ities until each could make an individual bond, and the prosecution
132. Id.
133. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
134. Jurisdiction exists of course under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4)
(1970), whenever the claim is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The ques-
tion is whether the court will exercise its jurisdiction.
135. See, e.g., Livingston v. Garmire, 437 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1971);
Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968); Crosson v. Silver, 319 F.
Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970); Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F. Supp. 926 (N.D.
Miss. 1968); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Ware v.
Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967).
136. See Hodsdon v. Stabler, 444 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Star
Satellite, Inc. v. Rosetti, 441 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1971) (relief against ob-
scenity prosecutions). Cf. Coleman v. Yokum, 442 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1971).
137. See Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Law-
rence v. Lordi, 324 F. Supp. 1092 (D.N.J. 1971). See also Hearn v. Short,
327 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (relief against obscenity prosecutions).
138. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 266-67.
139. 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966).
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had insisted on trying each case separately. Granting affirmative
relief, the court found:
The record discloses a pattern of conduct on the part of
the officials of the city of Jackson that leads us to the con-
clusion that defendants took advantage of every oppor-
tunity, serious or trivial, to break up these demonstrations
in protest against racial discrimination, and that a large
number of the arrests had no other motive, and some had
no justification whatever, either under municipal, State,
or Federal law.140
Similarly, in Houser v. Hill,'4' the court enjoined police officials
from inflicting summary punishment against blacks and arresting
them upon pretense and subterfuge for the purpose of deterring
them from the exercise of their constitutional rights. 42  In such
cases, 43 the arrests and prosecutions were part of a broader scheme
of harassment, and the injunctions against the pending prosecu-
tions were, in a sense, merely incidental to the relief against the
harassment.14 4  But if this aspect of Dombrowski is to have any
vitality after Younger, it will be necessary for courts to grant re-
lief in less extreme situations.
At the other end, Cameron v. Johnson'4' clearly holds that some-
thing more than an allegedly improper state of mind on the part
of governmental officials must be shown, at least where there is
a plausible basis for the prosecution. In trying to stake out the
middle ground justifying relief after Younger, reconsideration of
Dombrowski itself is useful. There the Court found: (1) raids
and seizure of files; (2) lack of probable cause for arrests; (3) pub-
lic "exposure" by use of photostatic copies of the illegally seized
documents; and (4) threatened prosecutions under an unconstitu-
tional law.' 4 0 In other words, acts by government officials, other
than bringing the prosecution demonstrated an intent to repress
the exercise of first amendment rights. Further, the circumstances
of the case suggested that as a result of those acts, the chilling
effect upon the exercise of such rights was a real-not hypothetical
-possibility. Therefore, as the Court pointed out in Younger, the
140. Id. at 838.
141. 278 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
142. The court also issued a counterinjunction against the plaintiffs, re-
straining them from "[s]ponsoring or arranging meetings and assemblies to
be addressed by those who advocate violence through the use of weapons
and other conduct designed to and tending to disrupt the peace and order
of the community; and [u]sing violent means to protest and demonstrate."
Id. at 929.
143. See also Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969),
vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (relief against police harassment of "hip-
pies"); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
144. As was true in "traditional" cases, where the court enjoined pending
prosecutions on the ground of harassment. See note 16 supra.
145. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
146. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 238, 240-42.
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plaintiffs had alleged the "irreparable injury" entitling them to
relief.
After Younger, it would, I think, be a mistake to concentrate
simply on the "bad faith and harassment" aspect of Dombrowski.
Instead, Dombrowski and Younger should be read as holding that
federal injunctive or declaratory relief is warranted where the
plaintiffs have established "irreparable injury," and that bad faith
enforcement is only one basis of establishing such injury. The
Court in Younger indicated agreement with this view when it
stated, "[t]here may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in
which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the ab-
sence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.' 14 7
Using the example of prosecution under a "flagrantly and patently"
unconstitutional law, the Court commented that there might be
still other "unusual situations calling for federal intervention,' u 48
but that there was no point in attempting to specify what they
might be. The cue from Younger, I submit, is to concentrate on
showing "irreparable injury" by providing evidence of a demon-
strable chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights.
Let me illustrate this approach by consideration of McSurely v.
Ratliff,1 49 a case that I discussed "from within" in an earlier ar-
ticle.15 0 To a large extent the incidents were a replay of Dom-
browski, even to the point of involving the Southern Conference
Educational Fund. On the night of August 15, 1967, a party of 15
armed men, led by the prosecutor, conducted midnight raids on
the homes of three antipoverty workers in Pike County, Kentucky,
ransacking the dwellings and impounding large quantities of books
and papers. Two of the workers, Alan and Margaret McSurely,
were on the staff of the Southern Conference Educational Fund and
the third, Joe Mulloy, was employed by the Appalachian Volun-
teers.'" The case became a cause celebre in Pike County; the
prosecutor made frequent press and radio announcements suggest-
ing that antipoverty workers were planning to try to "'take over
Pike County from the power structure and put in in the hands of
the poor.' ",152 Immediate political repercussions echoed throughout
the state with the Governor and the Director of the Federal Office
of Economic Opportunity jointly announcing the termination of any
147. 401 U.S. at 53.
148. Id. at 53-54.
149. 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
150. Sedler, supra note 3, at 631-39. I have summarized the facts briefly
here; they are discussed at length in id. at 633-35.
151. When Joe announced that he would resist the draft, he was dis-
charged by the Appalachian Volunteers. He was then employed by the
Southern Conference Educational Fund. Joe's draft resistance, in which
the author served as his counsel, resulted in the "Mulloy reopening doc-
trine." Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
152. Sedler, supra note 3, at 634.
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future funding for the Appalachian Volunteers in Kentucky. 153 The
Dombrowski-type suit was filed shortly after the arrests were
made. Subsequently, the Pike County grand jury issued a report
alleging a "communist plot" (complete with "Red Guards") to take
over Pike County, 5 4 and returned indictments against not only
Mulloy and the McSurelys, but also Carl Braden, the director of
the Southern Conference Educational Fund,') and his wife, Anne,
an official of the Southern Conference.' 56 The prosecution was
primed for a political trial, designed to reveal that all Pike County
antipoverty workers were "communists."
Enjoining the prosecutions, the federal court found both bad faith
prosecution and facial invalidity. With respect to the "bad faith"
aspect of Dombrowski, it stated:
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the criminal prosecu-
tions were instituted, at least in part, in order to stop plain-
tiffs' organizing activities in Pike County. That effort has
been successful. Not only has there been the "chilling ef-
fect" on freedom of speech referred to in Dombrowski,
there has been in fact a freezing effect. The Governor has
issued a public statement that federal funds to the Appala-
chian Volunteers should be discontinued. Plaintiff's pos-
sessions have been seized and impounded and they have
been placed in jail. The Bradens, who originally had not
been charged with any offense, were indicted and placed
in jail after they attempted to render assistance to the
other plaintiffs. Clearly, the criminal prosecutions have
put a damper on plaintiffs' freedom of speech, as well as
on others who might be in sympathy with their objec-
tives.1 57
Again, bad faith was demonstrated by acts other than bringing
the prosecution-the raids, the seizure, and the public statements-
which in conjunction with the prosecution evidenced an intent to
repress dissent and social change effort.
Moreover, as the court itself emphasized, the prosecution and
the other acts produced independent detrimental consequences. Fed-
eral funding was threatened, the plaintiffs' ability to carry on their
activities was impaired by the seizure of their books and documents,
and-perhaps most important-a real chilling effect was created
since others would hesitate both to associate with the plaintiffs and
to carry on similar activities. Furthermore, although this was not
discussed in the opinion, once the state prosecution had begun, the
153. Id. at 635.
154. The report must be seen to be believed. It is set out in id. at 636.
155. Succeeding James Dombrowski of Dombrowski v. Pfister fame.
156. Anne Braden had never been in Pike County and Carl had been
there only once before. They were going there at the time to post bond
for the McSurelys, and when they were late in arriving, the judge issued a
bench warrant for their arrest.
157. 282 F. Supp. at 852-53.
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plaintiffs would have suffered a political defeat, even though
they might ultimately have been vindicated. The prosecutor was
planning a political trial in the clearest sense; 158 besides attempting
to show that antipoverty efforts in Pike County were part of a com-
munist plot to overthrow the government of Pike County, he
would have tried to portray all concerned-the Bradens, the Mc-
Surelys, Mulloy, the SCEF staff, and the other Appalachian volun-
teers-as "communists," "dupes," "sympathizers," and the like. De-
nial of the plot "disclosed" would have been futile, for, as the
prosecutor would undoubtedly point out, "every communist denies
it." With the suspicion planted it is almost impossible to believe
that the defendants would not have been found guilty. Any sub-
sequent reversal of the conviction would have had little practical
consequence; "technicalities" could never obscure the earlier
"brand." In short, if the case had been allowed to come to trial,
the government officials would have won the political victory,
and from the political perspective, the prosecution itself, "unaf-
fected by the prospects of its success or failure,"'150 would truly
have caused "irreparable injury." These adverse political effects
must therefore be added to the independent detrimental conse-
quences that prosecution would have produced. 160
Finally, the nature of the sedition law itself must be considered.
In the court's own words, "[i] t is difficult to believe that capable
lawyers could seriously contend that this statute is constitu-
tional."' 1 Enacted in 1920 before the development of modern first
amendment law, the statute had never been interpreted by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. 162 It certainly would have met even
the "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional" test of Younger,
much less the Dombrowski facial invalidity standard.
158. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 635-37. As I pointed out in the article,
Carl Braden is Kentucky's "Red Scare." In 1954 he was convicted under
the same statute in Louisville, and the conviction was ultimately reversed
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, but only on grounds of federal preemp-
tion. Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956). The first
"sedition" trial is discussed in Sedler, supra note 3, at 638-39.
159. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
160. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 639.
161. 282 F. Supp. at 852. The court made this observation in the context
of discussing the bad faith nature of the prosecution.
162. The statute in question is clearly unconstitutional even under
the most flexible yardstick. It is too broad and too vague. It con-
travenes the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States because it unduly prohibits freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, and the right of assembly. It fails to distinguish between
the advocacy of ideas and the advocacy of action. It makes it a
criminal offense merely to possess, with intent to circulate, litera-
ture on the subject of sedition. It imposes the penalty of imprison-
ment for advocating an unpopular political belief. It would turn the
courts into a forum for argument of political theories with imprison-
ment the penalty for the loser. It contains no requirement of crimi-
nal intent. The unwary and the ignorant could be enmeshed in the
dragnet as easily as the covert plotter.
Id. at 851.
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McSurely contains three elements which, at least in combina-
tion, and possibly individually as well, should satisfy the criteria
for "irreparable injury:" (1) acts of public officials in addition to
bringing the prosecution, evidencing an intent to repress dissent
and social change effort; (2) independent detrimental consequences
resulting from the threatened prosecution and the other acts; and
(3) prosecution under a "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional
law." All add up to a demonstrable chilling effect upon the exercise
of first amendment rights by the plaintiffs and others. Moreover,
in the particular case, the elements were interrelated. As a result
of the acts evidencing the bad faith prosecution, the plaintiffs suf-
fered independent detrimental consequences, and the threatened
prosecution itself would have an adverse political effect. The in-
dependent detrimental consequences suggest entitlement to injunc-
tive relief under traditional equitable principles, regardless of bad
faith. Finally, the "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional na-
ture of the law under which the prosecutions were brought was
itself evidence of bad faith.' 63
The above analysis of "irreparable injury," coupled with the Su-
preme Court's discussion in Younger, indicates that courts may re-
tain a great deal of leeway to grant relief against pending prosecu-
tions. I shall therefore discuss each of these elements-bad faith
prosecution, independent detrimental consequences, and "flagrant
and patent" unconstitutionality-more fully, particularly in light of
post-Younger cases.
1. BAD FAITH PROSECUTION
Bad faith enforcement will likely be the major ground of attack
and thus requires the most discussion. As stated earlier, Cameron
v. Johnson'64 indicates that it will be very difficult to make out a
case of bad faith prosecution simply by trying to show improper
state of mind on the part of government officials. Hence, I shall
emphasize the importance of showing acts in addition to bringing
the prosecution which are illustrative of bad faith.
Nevertheless, some possibilities for showing bad faith on this
basis alone may remain. In the earlier article I argued that proof
of selective enforcement of the law in question should suffice to es-
tablish bad faith enforcement, since selective enforcement of a
valid law is itself unconstitutional,'16 5 particularly in the first
amendment context.'66 However, one court after Younger has held
that federal injunctive relief on this basis is improper, at least
where the claim of bad faith enforcement can be asserted in the
163. See note 161 supra.
164. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
165. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
166. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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state court.167 This reasoning ignores the fact that selective en-
forcement bears on the issue of the prosecutor's bad faith in ini-
tiating the prosecution. Without necessarily insisting that selective
enforcement per se justifies injunctive relief, the plaintiffs in a
Dombrowski-type suit should argue that selective enforcement cre-
ates a presumption of bad faith. Once demonstrated, the govern-
ment would have the burden of explaining why the law had not
been enforced against others. Prosecution under a law which has
lain dormant for so long as to become a "dead letter"' 68 presents an
analogous situation. Again, it can be argued that the use of such
a law against persons engaged in protest gives rise to a presumption
that it has been invoked in bad faith to suppress the protest ac-
tivity.169
It will be insufficient to prove merely that the plaintiffs have not
violated the law in question. In Cameron v. Johnson,17 ° the Court
emphasized that, "[t] he question for the District Court was not the
guilt or innocence of the persons charged; the question was whether
the statute was enforced against them with no expectation of con-
victions but only to discourage exercise of protected rights." How-
ever, this remark in turn suggests use of the "totally devoid of evi-
dence" argument developed in the Thompson v. City of Louisville'7'
line of cases.' 72 At the evidentiary hearing on the claim of bad
faith enforcement, the plaintiffs should attempt to show not only
that they did not violate the law in question, but also that the gov-
ernment cannot possibly produce any evidence to support a convic-
tion. Of course, the charge of bad faith enforcement will be bol-
stered by proof of additional acts by government officials which
demonstrate that the prosecution was part of an overall scheme to
repress dissent and social change effort. In any event, in order to
make out a case of bad faith enforcement, the plaintiffs should
attempt to establish as many of the following elements as possible:
(1) acts in addition to the institution of the prosecution; (2) se-
lective enforcement; (3) prosecution under a "dead letter" law;
(4) a total lack of evidence to support a conviction. 73 While any
one of these elements may be sufficient, obviously the more the
plaintiffs can show, the greater the likelihood of success.
I would like further to illustrate the bad faith enforcement attack
by detailed consideration "from within," of another Southern Con-
167. Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
168. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
169. See Stickgold, supra note 20, at 376.
170. 390 U.S. 611, 621-22 (1968).
171. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
172. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
173. While it should be made separately, the "patent and flagrantly"
unconstitutional argument is also relevant in the context of establishing
bad faith.
[VOL. 1972:1
NUMBER 1] DOMBROWSKI IN THE WAKE OF YOUNGER 31
ference Educational Fund case, Honey v. Goodman.1'74 In the
spring of 1968, "civil disorders" erupted in Louisville, Kentucky.
Shortly thereafter, leaders of the Louisville black community-the
"Black Six"-were indicted on a charge of conspiring to destroy
private property. Coincidentally, the property described in the in-
dictment was all the property destroyed during the "disorders," and
the thrust of the prosecution was clear: to place the blame for
the riots on "black agitators" rather than on the police practices
in the black community that touched off the rioting.1 75 After the
prosecution moved for a change of venue on the ground that it
could not get a fair trial in Jefferson County (Louisville), the cir-
cuit court, in a totally unprecedented move, granted the motion,
transferring the case to Hart County, a rural county in south-central
Kentucky with practically no black residents. The case was sched-
uled for trial in January 1970.
Civil rights groups organized protests against the trial. Mike
Honey and Martha Allen were a young couple on the Southern Con-
ference staff assigned to work as coordinators of the Kentucky
chapter of the Southern Committee Against Repression. In that
capacity, they sent letters to 1,200 residents of Hart County, whose
names were listed in the telephone directory, protesting the upcom-
ing trial. The letter noted that the trial had been moved because,
"[t] he prosecutor in Louisville knows that he doesn't have evidence
for a conviction, and that is why he is dumping this case on you,"',7
174. 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970).
175. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders found that
deep hostility between police and ghetto communities was a primary cause
of the disorders surveyed by the Commission. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CiviL DIsORDERs, REPORT 299 (Bantam ed. 1968).
176. The full text of the letter, set out in 432 F.2d at 336, was:
[Dated] January 1, 1970
To: Citizens of Hart County
Dear Friends,
On January 5 [1970] six black people from Louisville are being
brought to trial in Hart County. The State claims that these people
caused the Louisville uprising of '68. This is a lie.
The prosecutor in Louisville knows he doesn't have evidence
for a conviction, and that is why he is dumping this case on you.
He seems to think that the citizens of Hart County will convict
these six people without any evidence.
Many people in Louisville are angry about this prosecution.
They are angry because City and State officials are trying to make
scapegoats of these six people. These officials are trying to make
fools of you by moving the case from Louisville to Munfordville.
Don't be fooled. The same problems that exist in Jefferson
County exist in Hart County, and they will not be solved by such
shenanigans. The politicians are trying to jail these six people be-
cause they spoke up about unemployment, bad housing, poverty and
racism. If they can be jailed for speaking their minds, so can you.
The politicians are trying to make fools of all of us. They tell
us that social problems are our fault-not theirs. They try to use
the race question to keep black and white divided. We are angry
about all of this. We hope you are angry too. Enclosed is a folder
about some of the things we are doing to protest this injustice.
We urge you to protest against this trial being pushed off on you.
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and urged the people to "protest against this trial being pushed
off on you.' 77 A folder describing other anti-repressive efforts was
also enclosed.
On January 5, 1970, the opening day of the circuit court term, the
circuit judge stated to the grand jury that a "heinous crime"'178 had
been committed. Taking a copy of the letter out of his pocket, the
judge displayed it to the grand jury, commenting that if any of
them had received such a letter, he should report it to the prosecu-
tor.179 He then stated that sending the letter constituted the com-
mon law crime of embracery-an offense which the prosecuting at-
torney would later explain to them. Finally, he exclaimed that "he
would find out who was responsible for the sending of the letter
even if this necessitated the cooperation of the United States post
office."' 80 He concluded by returning the "Black Six" case to Jef-
ferson County on the ground that sending the letter made it impos-
sible to try the case in Hart County.' 8 ' After court adjourned, the
prosecuting attorney publicly stated that he would seek criminal
indictments against the letter's signers; two days later indictments
were returned against Mike and Martha, charging them with the
common law offense of embracery.18 2
A search of reported decisions disclosed that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals had discussed the common law offense on only two oc-
casions-once in 1827 and again in 1930. In both cases the court
defined the offense as "an attempt to influence a jury corruptly to
one side, by promises, persuasions, entreaties . . . or the like."' 8 3
In the 1930 case, the court held that the offense could be committed
by soliciting a prospective juror, but directed dismissal of the indict-
ment in the particular case because the person solicited had not been
selected to serve. It is hardly surprising that this case was the last
Yours very truly,
[signed] Mike Honey & Martha Allen
Mike Honey and Martha Allen
Coordinators, Kentucky Chapter
Southern Committee Against Repression
177. 432 F.2d at 336.
178. Id. at 337.
179. Actually there were two prosecutors. In Kentucky, there is a
county attorney for each of the 120 counties and a commonwealth's attor-
ney for each of the 50 judicial districts. Both the county attorney and the
commonwealth's attorney were involved here, and both were joined as de-
fendants in the federal suit. The county attorney made the public
statements referred to above.
180. 432 F.2d at 337.
181. Parenthetically, the conspiracy charge in the case was so devoid of
evidentiary support that when the case was finally tried in Louisville, the
"Black Six" received a directed verdict.
182. Kentucky still allows prosecutions for common law offenses. See
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 431.060, 431.070, 431.075 (1962).
183. Commonwealth v. Denny, 235 Ky. 588, 591, 31 S.W.2d 940, 941-42
(1930); Brown v. Beauchamp, 21 Ky. (5 Mon.) 413, 415 (1827), See also
26 AM. JuR. 2d Embracery § 1 (1966),
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reported reference to the common law offense, since attempting to
bribe a juror is a statutory offense in Kentucky, and since other
efforts to influence an individual juror fall within the purview of
the state's obstruction of justice statute. 8 4 Clearly, the common
law offense had become a "dead letter" (although perhaps "letter"
is not the right term), but it provided the only method on which
the judge and the prosecutor could proceed to punish sending a let-
ter to 1,200 persons, some of whom might be selected for jury
service.18 5
We immediately brought a Dombrowski-type suit, alleging the
facial invalidity of the common law offense, 8 6 as well as its uncon-
stitutionality as applied."8 7 As to the "bad faith and harassment"
aspect of Dombrowski, we alleged that: (1) the prosecutions were
instituted in bad faith for the purpose of inhibiting the plaintiffs
and others from criticizing the administration of justice in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky; (2) the prosecutions constituted an
extreme form of selective enforcement, because the conduct for
which the plaintiffs were being prosecuted-expressing their opin-
ions to a mass audience on proceedings that are pending or will be
pending in some court-was engaged in constantly by commentators
and editors of newspapers and other forms of the mass media, and
those persons were never prosecuted; and (3) the plaintiffs were
charged with the offense solely because of disagreement with the
nature of their expression. The basic theory of this attack was first
that Hart County officials, including the judge, whom we did not
name as defendant, 18 wanted to prosecute the plaintiffs because
they "dared" to criticize the administration of justice in Kentucky,
and second that Hart County officials wanted an excuse to "buck"
the case back to Louisville. 8 9 As a practical matter, I expected
184. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 432.220,- 432.300 (1962). See Schackelford v.
Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 51, 214 S.W. 788 (1919).
185. In fact, only four members of the jury panel had received the
letter.
186. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
187. By this time it was clear that the unconstitutionality of a law as
applied could be the basis of a Dombrowski-type attack. See Entertain-
ment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969). See
also Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969). The
main thrust of my argument was based on the unconstitutionality of the
common law offense as applied to the conduct of the plaintiffs, and the
facial invalidity argument was related to unconstitutional application. I
argued that the interpretation that the Hart County officials put on the
common law offense-that it applied to sending a mass circulation letter
to 1,200 persons who might be prospective jurors-rendered the offense
overbroad, and that this interpretation was sanctioned by the decision in
Commonwealth v. Denny, 235 Ky. 588, 31 S.W.2d 940 (1930).
188. I believe at that time I was under the erroneous impression that a
judge enjoyed immunity in a section 1983 case even as to injunctive relief.
The immunity extends only to liability for damages.
189. I think that the "political and propaganda effort" had a good deal
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
ultimately to prevail on constitutional grounds without having to
reach the issue of bad faith prosecution.
The district judge summarily dismissed the suit two days after
it was filed without waiting for the defendants' answer on the
ground that the allegations of the complaint failed to show "irrep-
arable injury." We immediately appealed to the Sixth Circuit and
sought an injunction pending appeal to block the trial scheduled for
April. The Sixth Circuit ordered the prosecutor to respond, and
he agreed to postpone the state trial until after the court of appeals
decided the case. The Sixth Circuit advanced the case for argument
in June and handed down its decision in early October.
There was no doubt that the district judge had erred in his inter-
pretation of "irreparable injury," and the Sixth Circuit was con-
cerned primarily with the "2283 problem," since our suit by necessity
had been filed after the indictment was returned. As I will discuss
subsequently, 1 0 the court of appeals held that section 2283 was
not a bar to a Dombrowski-type suit in the circumstances presented
However, the court upheld the common law offense on its face and
refused to consider its constitutionality as applied.191 It then held
that we had clearly stated a claim for relief under the "bad faith
and harassment" aspect of Dombrowski and remanded the case for
an evidentiary hearing, at which we would have the "'heavy bur-
den' of showing that the State instituted the proceedings in bad
faith and with no real hope of ultimate success, in order to chill
the free expression of unpopular ideas.' 92
By the scheduled date of the evidentiary hearing, the controversy
had become somewhat moot. The "Black Six" trial had been moved
back to Louisville where the defendants had been acquitted for lack
of evidence-as stated in the letter. Mike and Martha had moved
to Memphis, Tennessee, to take up new duties. Since neither side
had anything to gain politically from further proceedings, by mu-
tual agreement the state court prosecutions were dropped and the
federal suit was dismissed. 193
Had an evidentiary hearing been held, I would have tried to show
discussions between the judge and the prosecutor, and possibly oth-
ers, about the "Black Six" case and about the letter. I hoped that
this would demonstrate both a desire to use the sending of the
letter as an excuse to get rid of the trial and a genuine indignation
to do with that desire. The Hart County officials did not relish an "inva-
sion of blacks and radicals" for the trial.
190. See text accompanying note 258 infra.
191. It implied that this question could be considered by the district
judge upon remand.
192. 432 F.2d at 344.
193. A practical effect of the availability of the Dombrowski-type suit
is that the delay in bringing the case to trial may "cool the confrontation
situation." In one sense, Honey resulted in a "stalemate." But in another
sense, it was a "victory" because the threatened prosecution did not occur.
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that "these two young radicals from out of town would dare to
criticize the courts." I would have borne down most heavily on
the claim of selective enforcement. Here I had hoped to demon-
strate that local newspapers commented on potentially pending
cases when arrests were made; I was fairly certain that the Louis-
ville Courier-Journal, the only paper of statewide circulation, had
commented on the "Black Six" case at various times after it had
been transferred to Hart County. I also thought that I could show
discussions on radio and television.' 9 '
Thus, all of the elements supporting the charge of bad faith en-
forcement outlined previously were present here. There were: (1)
acts in addition to the institution of the prosecution-the statements
of the judge from the bench and the prosecutor's statements to the
press; (2) a "dead letter" law; and (3) a strong case for selective
enforcement. 19 5 The "total lack of evidence to support a convic-
tion" argument would have related to our contention that the law
was unconstitutional as applied: there was a total lack of evidence
that Mike and Martha had engaged in conduct that could constitu-
tionally be punished. 96 Since this was a "pure speech" case and
the facts were not in dispute, the prosecutor would likely have
been unable to cloud the issue. Thus, I think Honey is a good ex-
ample of how the various elements can be combined to make out
a case of bad faith prosecution, and it would have been interesting
to see what would have happened if the case had been tried.
We may now consider how the bad faith enforcement attack has
fared since Younger. In Taylor v. City of Selma,197 a three-judge
court found that prosecutions under the Alabama antiriot act, aris-
ing out of events during a 1966 election campaign, had been brought
in bad faith for harassment purposes to prevent the plaintiffs'
participation in the campaign. 198 Without elaborating on the rea-
sons for its findings,1 99 the court enjoined the pending prosecutions,
194. Judge Kalbfleisch, concurring, took a very restrictive view of a
showing of selective enforcement, contending that it was limited to dis-
cussions of the "Black Six" case. 432 F.2d at 345. I would have tried to
show discussions of other pending cases as well.
195. Here, the "dead letter" law and selective enforcement arguments
blend together.
196. The "interference with the administration of justice" cases repre-
sent one area where the Supreme Court has been consistently applying the
"clear and present danger" test. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). It is impossible to see how it
could be contended that sending the letter in question to 1,200 residents
created the requisite "clear and present danger." See Craig v. Harney,
supra at 376.
197. 327 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
198. The plaintiffs had appealed their convictions from an inferior court
and were awaiting a trial de novo. The court stayed those proceedings
in May 1967 until its final disposition of the case. No explanation was
given for the long delay in making that disposition.
199. 327 F. Supp. at 1193.
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declared the statute unconstitutional on its face, and enjoined future
enforcement as well.
Duncan v. Perez, 200 a second post-Younger bad faith prosecution
case, arose out of a complex and lengthy set of facts. Duncan, a
black, was first arrested on a charge of cruelty to juveniles after an
incident "related to the racial tension which accompanied the fed-
erally ordered desegregation of schools in Plaquemines Parish."
'20 1
He had allegedly slapped a twelve-year-old white boy on the arm
while breaking up a confrontation between four whites and his two
cousins. His attorneys filed a motion to quash on the ground that
the statute was only applicable where a parental relationship ex-
isted. The prosecuting attorney then advised the complainants to
file an affidavit charging simple battery. The day after Duncan
appeared in court on the cruelty to juveniles charge he was arrested
on the battery charge.20 2 Bail was set at $1,500, double the figure
under the suggested bond schedule in effect in the parish. Duncan
was found guilty of battery and sentenced to two months in prison
and a $150 fine, with an additional 20 days in prison if the fine was
not paid-an unusually heavy sentence given the nature of the of-
fense.2 0 3  After his lawyer was arrested on a charge of improper
practice of law, a federal court issued an injunction, finding prose-
cution to have been brought in bad faith.20 4 Duncan then encoun-
tered difficulty obtaining release on bond pending appeal. His con-
viction was ultimately reversed by the United States Supreme Court
on the ground of denial of the right to trial by jury.20 5  When the
state sought to prosecute him again, Duncan turned to the federal
court for affirmative relief.
Looking at the total set of circumstances-the arrests, the unusu-
ally high bond and sentence,20 the difficulty in obtaining release
pending appeal, the arrest and prosecution of his attorney, and the
comments of the prosecutor and the judge2 0 7-the court found that
the prosecution had been instituted in bad faith and issued an in-
junction. It also observed that any violation that the plaintiff might
200. 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 321 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970).
201. 321 F. Supp. at 181-82.
202. Id. at 182.
203. Evidence at the federal court hearing revealed that over a five year
period in the judicial district, sentence was imposed 84 times in battery
cases. In only 15 cases was imprisonment ordered, and in only five did
the sentence exceed that imposed on Duncan. In four of those cases, there
existed an additional more serious charge.
204. Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
205. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
206. See note 203 supra.
207. The judge berated the plaintiff's lawyers, saying that they only
wanted to have the Louisiana law denying jury trials in misdemeanor cases
declared unconstitutional. He admitted on discovery that this fact influ-
enced the sentence that he imposed on the plaintiff. 321 F. Supp. at
182-83.
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have committed was "so slight and technical as to be generally re-
served for law school hypotheticals rather than criminal prosecu-
tions, ' 20 8 and that such de minimis "batteries" frequently occurred
and were not prosecuted. Finally, the court speculated that the
plaintiff would not have been prosecuted at all, and certainly would
not have been reprosecuted, "were it not for the civil rights context
out of which the case arose. 20 9
When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, Younger had already
been decided, and in the view of the court of appeals, "the district
judge accurately forecast by his opinion that criteria which the
Supreme Court established in Younger v. Harris for the grant of
federal injunctive relief against state prosecutions. 21 0  It com-
mented that where the state prosecution had been instituted in bad
faith and for the purpose of harassment, "irreparable injury" need
not be shown. A more accurate statement would have been that a
bad faith prosecution necessarily constitutes "irreparable injury,"
because there is a federal constitutional right to be free from such
prosecutions.
Both Taylor and Duncan are "southern cases," for which the Dom-
browski-type suit was originally designed. In such cases, the federal
courts-having had long experience with discriminatory and repres-
sive law enforcement against blacks and civil rights activists-may
be more disposed toward finding bad faith. Nonetheless, the cases
are important illustrations of the viability of the bad faith attack
after Younger. Even more significant, because of the absence of
racial overtones, however, may be the recent case of Shaw v. Garri-
son.211 The court found that a perjury prosecution, instituted two
days after Clay Shaw was acquitted of conspiracy to assassinate
President Kennedy, had been brought in bad faith "with the spe-
cific intent to deprive Shaw of his rights under the First, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments .... ,,212 Among the points that the court
emphasized were: (1) Garrison's using sodium penathol and hyp-
nosis on the "key witness" and instituting the conspiracy charge
when that person identified Shaw as being present at a meeting
with Oswald; (2) the fact that Garrison had been told by a police
lieutenant prior to the trial that the "key witness" could not
identify Shaw as having been present at the meeting; (3) Garrison's
receipt of money from outside sources to finance the investigation
and prosecution of Shaw, and the perjury prosecution as an effort
to "produce results" for Garrison's backers; (4) the circumstances
208. Id. at 184.
209. Id. The court also specifically found that the reprosecution of
Duncan "would deter and suppress the exercise of federally secured rights
by Negroes in Plaquemines Parish," and that Duncan could assert their
rights. Id. at 184-85.
210. 445 F.2d at 558.
211. 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971).
212. Id. at 397.
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surrounding Shaw's arrest,213 Garrison's statements to the press,
and extensive pretrial publicity; (5) the fact that there was no
other instance where a defendant who took the stand and was ac-
quitted was subsequently prosecuted for perjury; and (6) Garrison's
significant financial interest in continuing the prosecution of Shaw,
since he had written a book about his investigation of the alleged
conspiracy. The case, then contained the numerous acts in addition
to the prosecution, as well as selective enforcement, and also was
analogous to a situation of "total lack of evidence to support a con-
viction." Of course, other factors were present as well,2 14 but the
case does point out how the total situation can demonstrate the bad
faith of a prosecution.
However, other post-Younger cases have held claims of bad faith
enforcement not proven. In Lewis v. Kugler,21 )5 the plaintiffs al-
leged that the New Jersey state police were singling out persons
of "individualized personal appearance" 21 6 travelling on the high-
ways and were routinely searching their vehicles. Nine of the
plaintiffs had been subject to marijuana prosecutions as a result
of the searches. It was further alleged that these searches were
indicative of bad faith on the part of the state police and demon-
strated deliberate harassment of so-called "long-haired travel-
lers. ' 21 7 The court disagreed, stating that an experienced police of-
ficer could decide to "direct more attention in the performance of
his police duties to the activities of some persons than to others,' 2 1 8
and observing that the illegality of the search could be asserted as
a defense to the state criminal prosecution. The case did not pre-
sent a sympathetic atmosphere for a finding of bad faith, given the
court's implicit assumption that persons of individualized personal
appearance are more likely to be drug users. Moreover, the only
evidence of bad faith was the allegedly illegal searches. Also, hav-
ing been arrested for possession of marijuana, the plaintiffs were
certainly, in the view of the Court, engaged in "hard core" activ-
ity. Finally, the case involved "life style repression" rather than
political repression, and while there are important first amendment
overtones here, they do not focus as sharply as in "political cases."
The federal court simply was not about to enjoin the prosecution
213. Shaw was led handcuffed into a hallway, where a crowd of news-
men, photographers, television camera crews, and members of the general
public were gathered. He was shoved through the crowd to reach an
elevator leading to the basement. All of this appeared on television. He
could have been taken down in a private elevator located in Garrison's
office. The court stated that "Shaw's arrest and the manner in which it
was effected was outrageous and inexcusable." Id. at 399.
214. The facts in the case are set out in great detail in id. at 392-400.
215. 324 F. Supp. 1220 (D.N.J.), vacated and remanded, 446 F.2d 1343
(3d Cir. 1971).
216. Id. at 1221.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1223.
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of "drug users. '219
Similarly, in Ascheim v. Quinlan,220 the plaintiffs had originally
been arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct arising out of an
antiwar demonstration. When the case came to trial in city court,
a large group of their supporters were present. During the trial,
some "leaped up in noisy protest"221 when a tipstaff tried to turn
one of the plaintiffs around to face the magistrate. The magistrate
then ordered the courtroom cleared; the police had moved most
of the spectators through the courtroom door "when a melee broke
out involving the officers and those being ejected. '222 The police
filed charges of aggravated assault and battery, inciting to riot,
and assault on a police officer against the plaintiffs and others. A
federal suit was brought to enjoin the prosecutions. The plaintiffs
contended that the tipstaff had pulled the person's long hair while
trying to turn him around and that the police used obscene and
insulting language toward the spectators and attacked a number
of them. They also alleged existence of an overall plan to harass
persons such as themselves and introduced evidence of other in-
stances of police violence against those holding unpopular views.
Refusing relief the court found that: (1) the prosecutions could
not be said to have been instituted without any hope of ultimate
success; (2) even if bad faith were involved, there was no evidence
to show that the officers intended to "deter the plaintiffs in the
exercise of their First Amendment rights; '223 (3) the conduct of the
plaintiffs out of which the prosecution arose was not entitled to first
amendment protection; and (4) the particular policemen who pre-
ferred the charges were not involved in the other instances of al-
leged harassment and that the evidence regarding the incident in
the city court was conflicting. 224 Here the "hard core" nature of
the plaintiffs' conduct, the difficulty of assigning "motive" to police
officers as opposed to higher ranking officials, and the difficulty of
proving a "police conspiracy" made the plaintiffs' burden insur-
mountable. The federal suit's primary purpose may well have been
political-to expose police brutality against dissenters. But the case
219. On appeal, the decision was affirmed insofar as the court refused to
enjoin the pending prosecutions. The remand occurred with regard to
relief against future prosecutions. See text accompanying note 323 infra.
220. 324 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
221. Id. at 791.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 796. The requirement of specific intent to violate first
amendment rights is questionable. So long as the prosecution was brought
in bad faith, an intention to repress exists, and that should be sufficient.
224. It did, however, observe that "some of the testimony of excessive
force by individual police officers on specific occasions was quite disturbing
and should cause concern in the minds of those officials who have the
responsibility of determining the accuracy of such charges and taking ap-
propriate action." 324 F. Supp. at 793-94.
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was not one in which bad faith prosecution could realistically have
been established.2 2
5
The result in each of these cases was fairly predictable. While
a claim of bad faith enforcement can be sustained, particularly
where there are additional acts, as in Duncan and Shaw, the case
will be increasingly difficult if the plaintiffs are accused of having
engaged in "hard core conduct," as in Lewis and Ascheim. It re-
mains to be seen how courts will deal with the bad faith criterion
after Younger in future cases where the conduct in question falls
within these two extremes.
2. INDEPENDENT DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The second basis of "irreparable injury" suggested is that of in-
dependent detrimental consequences. As in Dombrowski and Mc-
Surely, the independent consequences may be related to the bad
faith nature of the prosecution; further, a showing of independent
detrimental consequences alone should be sufficient. If, for exam-
ple, McSurely had involved a "straight" sedition prosecution, 226 un-
accompanied by midnight raids and seizure of documents, and as a
result of the threatened prosecution the Appalachian Volunteers
faced a cutoff of federal funds, or if the criminal trial itself would
have had an adverse political effect, then the remedy by way of de-
fense to the prosecution would not have assured adequate vindi-
cation of federal constitutional rights. In such circumstances, the
distinction between affirmative and defensive relief, particularly in
terms of immediacy, becomes significant. As a matter of substan-
tive law, plaintiffs will be entitled to relief against the prosecutions
only if the underlying law is unconstitutional;2 27 but the existence
of independent detrimental consequences should constitute "irrep-
arable injury," thereby entitling them to a determination of the
constitutional question by the federal court.
Therefore, I would contend that the showing of a specific chilling
effect on the exercise of first amendment rights due to a pending
state court proceeding constitutes independent detrimental conse-
quences resulting from that proceeding, thus satisfying the require-
ment of "irreparable injury"; the sufficiency of this specific chilling
effect to justify federal intervention would, of course, depend on the
facts of the particular case. This argument is poignantly illus-
trated when relief is sought against enforcement of a state court
injunction issued in a civil suit. Apart from the question of whether
the test for federal intervention is as stringent when civil as op-
posed to criminal proceedings are involved, 228 the existence of an
225. See also Abramovich v. Bionaz, 326 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
226. We will presume an "honest but stupid" prosecutor.
227. Where bad faith is established, of course, it does not matter if the
underlying law is unconstitutional.
228, See Younger v. Harris, 401 U,S. 37, 54 (1971) (Stewart & Harlan,
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outstanding injunction prohibiting protest activity necessarily has
a specific chilling effect. If the injunction is violated, those subject
to it can be held in contempt,22 and they may be unable to assert
its unconstitutionality as a defense. 23 0 While an. appeal in the
state courts might be available, this procedure will often be more
shadow than substance; where immediate relief is needed, as for
example, where individuals wish to protest a recent event, the time
lag between the event and the decision on appeal renders that
remedy grossly inadequate.231 In such circumstances, it can be con-
tended that affirmative relief via federal intervention is imperative
to avoid "irreparable injury. '23 2
The cases support this contention. In the pre-Younger case of
Machesky v. Bizzel, 23 3 the Fifth Circuit enjoined enforcement of
a state court injunction on the ground of unconstitutional over-
breath.23 4 Since the court apparently took jurisdiction on the basis
of facial invalidity, the decision is now not as strong a precedent;
however, in two post-Younger cases, district judges have confronted
similar situations. In Duke v. Texas,235 a state court, after refusing
to consider any constitutional objections, issued an injunction bar-
ring nonstudents from speaking at an antiwar rally on a state uni-
versity campus. The federal court found that the plaintiffs "are
subject to a wholesale abridgment of their rights to freedom of
speech, press, assembly and association, which inherently consti-
tutes continuing irreparable injury." 236 It also pointed out that the
plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law, since the state judge
had failed to consider their constitutional arguments and concluded
that, "[i]n this case there is not merely a speculative 'chilling'
JJ., concurring). I emphasize that this discussion does not involve a
"pure" Younger situation; I have utilized the injunction problem only
because of its illustrative value.
229. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne County, 393
U.S. 175 (1968).
230. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Tefft,
Neither Above the Law Nor Below It: A Note on Walker v. Birmingham,
1967 S. CT. REv. 181.
231. Parties are not required to exhaust state judicial remedies before
seeking relief in the federal courts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167(1961). However, it may be asked whether in this situation the plaintiffs
would have to show that timely and effective relief in the state courts was
not available in order to establish "irreparable injury."
232. But see Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971), where the failure of the plain-
tiffs to try to vacate a temporary restraining order in the state court was
relied upon to justify a denial of federal relief. However, the case clearly
was not one in which time was of the essence.
233. 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
234. As will be subsequently discussed, the court also held that section
2283 was not a bar to relief in a Dombrowski-type suit.
235. 327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
236. Id. at 1234.
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threat, . . . but rather the cold reality of inestimable harm. '237
Likewise, in Montgomery County Board of Education v. Shel-
ton,238 the court enjoined enforcement of a state court injunction
which prohibited black high school students from engaging in pro-
test activities anywhere in the town except under strict conditions
as to place and manner.28 9 The state court injunction was held to
interfere with a prior federal court order restricting demonstra-
tions near the school;240 moreover, the court found it overbroad,
noting that the total effect of the federal and state court injunc-
tions "effectually stifled both the First Amendment rights and de-
sires of the black students peaceably to assemble and protest their
school-related grievances to those in authority. '24 1
A specific chilling effect may also arise from the mere fact of
criminal prosecution, regardless of the bad faith of the government
officials. For example, the prosecution may critically interfere with
the ability of the plaintiffs to carry on their dissent and social
change effort. McSurely v. Ratliff242 is a case in point, although
there the arrests, rather than the actual prosecution, caused cutoff of
federal aid to the Appalachian Volunteers. Again, as in McSurely,
the political impact of the trial itself could create a specific chilling
effect on the plaintiff's activities. In other words, whenever there
has been a showing of a specific chilling effect or other independent
detrimental consequences, there would exist a "threat to the plain-
tiff's federally protected rights that cannot be eliminated by his de-
fense against a single criminal prosecution, '243 and affirmative relief
would be proper. But it is essential to distinguish the hypothetical
chilling effect due to prosecution under a facially invalid law which
Younger holds insufficient, from the specific chilling effect or other
independent detrimental consequences due to the prosecution which,
under Dombrowski and Younger, may constitute "irreparable in-
jury."
3. FLAGRANT AND PATENT UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
The third basis of "irreparable injury," recognized in Younger,
is prosecution under a "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional
law.' 244 The difference between a law that is "void on its face"
and one that is "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional" is, of
237. Id.
238. 327 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
239. The injunction is set out in full in id. at 820-21.
240. This alone would justify federal injunctive relief on the ground
that such relief was necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction and
to protect and effectuate its judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
241. 327 F. Supp. at 819.
242. 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
243. This is the "boilerplate language" of Dombrowski and Younger.
244. It should be emphasized that "patently and flagrantly unconstitu-
tional" is a separate basis of "irreparable injury" apart from its relevance
to show the bad faith of the prosecutor in instituting the action.
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course, one of emphasis and degree, but perhaps the question can
be approached in terms of "obvious impact." In Younger, the Su-
preme Court appeared to be trying to avoid putting the federal
courts in the position of having to engage in a detailed analysis of
the specific provisions of a law to determine whether it met recog-
nized standards of specificity and precision. Such an investigation
was required in the Boyle-situation, where the lower court upheld
many of the provisions of the challenged laws,245 but invalidated
one section of the Illinois intimidation statute. The process of de-
tailed analysis necessarily undertaken there clearly differs from
that of McSurely, where the court could tell essentially by merely
looking at the law that it was obviously unconstitutional. 246
The distinction between laws that are obviously unconstitutional
and those that can be found so only after a detailed analysis of their
specific provisions is illustrated by the post-Younger case, Hendricks
v. Hogan,247 involving a challenge to the New York flag desecration
statute. The court conceded that the plaintiffs might have a valid
claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
But since the court could not conclude that it was "patently and
flagrantly unconstitutional," relief was denied. As support for its
decision, the court observed that the Supreme Court had left the
constitutional question unresolved by its equally divided affirmance
of the decision of the New York Court of Appeals upholding the
statute.248 It might also have added that the lower federal courts
have disagreed on the constitutionality of similar flag desecra-
tion statutes.2 4 9 Hence, unlike the law in McSurely, the statute's
unconstitutionality was not obvious. 250
Thus far we have discussed the components of "irreparable in-
jury" in the abstract. However, as a practical matter, the extent
to which courts will find "irreparable injury" will be influenced in
no small part by the attitudes of the judges toward the Dombrow-
ski-type suit in general and by the situation presented in the par-
ticular case. Those federal judges hostile to federal intervention-
and there are many 251-will use Younger to buttress their refusal
245. See Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
246. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
247. 324 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
248. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846
(1970), aff'd sub nom. by an equally divided court, Radich v. New York,
401 U.S. 531 (1971). See also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
249. Compare, e.g., Crossen v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970),
with Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
250. See also Lawrence v. Lordi, 324 F. Supp. 1092, 1094 (D.N.J. 1971),
where the court observed that the statute under attack there was similar to
the one involved in Younger. As stated previously, the Court in Younger
did not consider whether the California statute was "patently and fla-
grantly unconstitutional," although a strong argument could have been
made to that effect.
251. Many, if not most, of the actual cases involving Dombrowski-type
suits-like other claims for federal relief-are determined at the district
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to grant relief, just as they were using other grounds before
Younger. In effect, they will read Younger as barring relief com-
pletely and will be unresponsive to attempts to distinguish that
case and to establish "irreparable injury." They can be expected to
bend over backwards to find bad faith not demonstrated and "ir-
reparable injury" not otherwise shown. More "interventionist-
oriented" federal judges will read Younger as narrowly as possible
and will make factual findings supporting "irreparable injury."
For those judges "in the middle," the result may well depend on
their view of the particular case. Insofar as patterns may develop,
they are likely to be reflected in decisions of the courts of appeal,
but here too differences may be expected. Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court will have to furnish further guidance.
4. STATE PROSECUTION AND SECTION 2283
The final question that must be considered with respect to pend-
ing state court proceedings is whether, even if "irreparable injury"
is shown, the provisions of title 28, section 2283, of the United States
code operate to bar federal relief. While the statute by its terms is
only applicable to injunctive relief,252 in light of Samuels v. Mack-
ell,255 it is difficult to believe that if the Supreme Court held that
section 2283 was a bar, it would nevertheless allow declaratory
relief in analogous circumstances. 2 4 The Supreme Court man-
aged to avoid the question in Dombrowski, Cameron, and
Younger and, as I suggested earlier,25 5 may be waiting to see what
happens before finally making up its mind.
In the meantime the question will have to be resolved by the
lower federal courts. As I pointed out in the original article, most of
the courts that had passed directly on the question held that once
the requirements for Dombrowski-type relief were satisfied, "special
court level, not infrequently in unreported opinions. An analysis of the
reported pre-Younger cases would convey the impression that the suit was
often successful. But the consensus among "movement" lawyers was to
the contrary. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 261.
252. In their concurring opinion in Younger, Justices Stewart and Har-
lan emphasized this point. 401 U.S. at 55.
253. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
254. In Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967), the court
relied on the granting of declaratory relief to avoid the section 2283 prob-
lem. The same course was followed in Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp.
293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), with respect to a challenge to a state anti-abortion
law. But this distinction is questionable after Samuels, where the Court
emphasized the similarity in effect between declaratory and injunctive re-
lief and also pointed out how the grant of declaratory relief, with a later
injunction if the order was not heeded-which is what happened in Bab-
bitz-could effectively circumvent the requirements of section 2283. In the
nonfederal context, the general prohibition against injunctive interference
with pending prosecutions is equally applicable to declaratory relief. See
Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E.2d 814 (1937).
255. See notes 124-129 supra and accompanying text.
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circumstances" existed justifying an exception to section 2283. As
the Fifth Circuit stated in Machesky v. Bizzell: 256
We hold also that where important public rights to full
dissemination of expression on public issues are abridged
by state court proceedings, the principles of comity em-
bodied in § 2283 must yield, and that the district court is
empowered to enjoin the state court proceedings to the
extent that they violate these First Amendment rights.2 57
By approaching the question in this manner, the court was not
obliged to hold that section 1983 was a "statutorily authorized"
exception to section 2283 in all circumstances, but only where a
case for Dombrowski-type relief is established. I stressed this point
before the Sixth Circuit in Honey and struck a responsive chord.
The court there stated:
We need not, and do not, decide that section 1983 is an
"express exception" to section 2283 under all circumstances.
We do find, however, that where the "highly unusual and
very limited circumstances of Dombrowski are plead and
proved, the frustration of superior federal interests that
would ensue from precluding an aggrieved citizen from
obtaining a stay of state court proceedings would be so
great as to pose a threat of irreparable injury to a national
interest.258
The court of appeals' approach in Honey is particularly signifi-
cant because it came after the Supreme Court's decision in Atlan-
tic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,25 9
which apparently restricted departures from section 2283 to the
specific statutory exceptions. However, it is possible to hold that
section 1983 is a statutorily authorized exception where the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" of a Dombrowski-type suit are present
without reaching the question of whether it is an exception in all
cases.260 This rationale has been adopted by the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits and is the approach now followed by the Third Circuit in
Dombrowski-type cases.261 Courts which have granted relief in the
post-Younger cases have also expressly held that section 2283 is not
an absolute bar. For the time being, then, it does not appear that
256. 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
257. Id. at 291. See also Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.
1969).
258. 432 F.2d at 343.
259. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). The dissenting judge in Honey read Atlantic
Coast Line as barring relief. 432 F.2d at 346.
260. For statutorily authorized exceptions to section 2283, see C. WRIGHT,
supra note 6, at 181-82.
261. Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969). In a
later case, however, that court reaffirmed its earlier position that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970) was a statutorily authorized exception to section 2283 in all
cases. DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970).
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the "2283 problem" will loom significant, at least where the court
is otherwise disposed to grant relief.262
B. Relief Against Future Prosecutions and Enforcement of
Unconstitutional Laws or Against Other Governmental Action
We may now turn our attention to relief against future prosecu-
tions and enforcement of unconstitutional laws or against other
governmental action. So long as the plaintiff can establish the
requisite interest to give him standing to challenge the law or action
in question, 263 such relief has been generally available in the federal
courts under traditional principles governing "threatened irrepara-
ble injury." However, prior to Dombrowski, affirmative actions
challenging repressive laws or governmental action on first amend-
ment grounds were relatively uncommon. 26 4 Dombrowski ex-
pressly recognized that the threatened enforcement of a facially
invalid law could have a chilling effect on the exercise of first
amendment rights, and on this basis future prosecutions were en-
joined. 265 By so doing, the Court indicated that relief against fu-
ture enforcement could be authorized whenever threatened en-
forcement created a chilling effect. Its recognition of the concept
of chilling effect raised the level of consciousness of the potential
targets of governmental repression and encouraged them to seek
relief in the federal courts before repression was brought to bear
against them.
From this perspective, Dombrowski must be viewed as an impor-
262. Where the federal suit was instituted after an arrest had been
made, but before an indictment was returned, it has been held that there
was no proceeding "pending" at the time the federal suit was brought.
McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967); Turner v. LaBelle,
251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966). There is no doubt, however, that a pro-
ceeding is pending for "Younger purposes" as soon as the arrest has been
made or the plaintiff has otherwise been proceeded against in the state
courts.
263. As applied to relief against enforcement of state law, this involves
the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally C.
WRIGHT, supra note 6 at 183-86.
264. This may have been due, in no small part, to the restrictive notion
of standing enunciated in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947), which seemed to say that no challenge could be made to a law ex-
cept by one who had actually violated its prohibitions. That aspect of
Mitchell was clearly overruled by Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967). And as has been observed, "subsequent case law has
weakened Mitchell as precedent in First Amendment cases [since] Mitchell
was decided prior to judicial recognition of the so-called 'chilling effect'
doctrine." National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546,
549 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
265. In Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964)-the only loyalty oath case
to come up from the lower federal courts instead of via the state courts-
the Court assumed the standing of persons subject to the oath to seek af-
firmative relief against its enforcement. Chilling effect was discussed spe-
cifically in regard to abstention, and the Court's rationale on that point
would be equally applicable to the standing question.
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tant step in the process of broadening standing266 to seek relief
against interference with first amendment rights, a process reflected
in the Supreme Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen 2 67 and in subse-
quent lower court cases.268 In Flast the Court developed the nexus
criteria of standing: was there a nexus between the status asserted
by the litigants and the claims they sought to present. In the
Dombrowski-type suit the concept of chilling effect is relevant both
to establish standing and to demonstrate "threatened irreparable
injury"; when relief is sought against the enforcement of laws or
other governmental action, standing, a limitation on judicial review,
and "irreparable injury," a remedies consideration, blend. Under
traditional remedies principles, a party who cannot show himself
harmed by the existence of a law or governmental action would
have no claim to relief and thus would be unable affirmatively to
assert a constitutional challenge. 269 Likewise, the absence of harm
would mean that the party would not have standing to seek judicial
review in the federal courts. 270 After Dombrowski, the plaintiff, by
showing that the threatened enforcement of a law or other govern-
mental action had a chilling effect on the exercise of his first amend-
ment rights, established "threatened irreparable injury," entitling
him to injunctive relief and correspondingly had standing to seek
review of the law's constitutionality.
For example, in National Student Association v. Hershey271 anti-
war organizations challenged the legality of the "Hershey Direc-
tive," prescribing the removal of draft deferments of registrants
found by their local boards to have engaged in "illegal protest ac-
tivity." The court of appeals first pointed out that the mere allega-
tion of "chilling effect" as such did not give rise to a justiciable
controversy, even in the area of first amendment rights.272 But,
266. It could be argued that Dombrowski enlarged the concept of ripe-
ness, an element of "case or controversy," rather than that of standing.
However, since standing itself has article III dimensions (Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 [1970]), the two
concepts are susceptible to analytical merger in some cases. I find analy-
sis under the concept of standing more fruitful.
267. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
268. See, e.g., United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462
(D.C. Cir. 1969); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp.
546 (D.D.C. 1969). Standing has generally been broadened in the non first
amendment area as well. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970).
269. However, in a number of states parties can bring taxpayers' suits
and presumably could challenge the constitutionality of certain laws in
this manner. Cf. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
270. The Court in Flast was careful to point out how the plaintiffs' first
amendment rights were necessarily harmed by the action they were chal-
lenging.
271. 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
272. Id. at 1113-14. This remark was made in the context of determin-
ing whether an article III case or controversy existed.
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on the other hand, if the allegations of chilling effect were true, the
plaintiff would suffer an immediate and real injury in the form of
inhibition of his exercise of his first amendment rights. Therefore,
in such cases, "courts may rely on a credible threat of enforcement
of plausible allegations of intent or desire to engage in the threat-
ened activities as sufficient predicates for justiciability.' '273 This
criterion seems equally applicable to a finding of "irreparable in-
jury," and indeed the court did not even discuss "irreparable in-
jury" separately. Instead, it found the "Hershey Directive" to be
an "authoritative declaration of policy issued for the guidance of
the System's line of officers '274 which would create a chilling effect
on holders of deferments, causing them to refrain from antiwar ac-
tivity for fear of losing their deferments. 27 Thus, there was a jus-
ticiable controversy, 276 and for our purposes, a showing of "irrep-
arable injury" on the part of draft-age males eligible for defer-
ment. The court also held that student political organizations which
had been engaged in antiwar and antidraft activities had standing to
challenge the legality of the directive, because "their organizational
interests and those of at least many of their members coincide. '277
The chilling effect of the directive on their members would have
a corresponding effect on the organizations' own protest activi-
ties.278  A judgment declaring the Hershey Directive to have been
unauthorized by statute was entered.
The above analysis demonstrates the specific chilling effect that
threatened enforcement of laws or other governmental action can
have upon the exercise of first amendment rights. Where such spe-
cific chilling effects can be shown, a Dombrowski-type suit is proper,
and the same considerations relevant to "irreparable injury" will
also establish the plaintiff's standing to make the challenge. Thus
in addition to challenges by draft registrants or representative or-
ganizations to actions such as the Hershey Directive,270 courts have
273. Id. at 1112-13.
274. Id. at 1115.
275. Id. at 1118. The court emphasized that lay draft boards would be
deciding whether the protest was "legal" or "illegal" and that this would
seriously compound "this chilling effect on protected conduct." Id. It
could have added that most draft board members would not look kindly
on any kind of protest activity.
276. However, the court found no justiciable controversy presented as
to the delinquency regulations, significant only after a punitive reclassifi-
cation had occurred, or as to the Local Board Memorandum, which dealt
only with draft card burning and therefore could not be said to violate
first amendment rights. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
277. 412 F.2d at 1120.
278. The standing of an organization to assert a chilling effect on its
members' first amendment activities had long been recognized. See
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
279. See also Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817
(2d Cir. 1967), where the registrants' local boards reclassified them 1-A and
declared them delinquents after they had participated in an antiwar dem-
onstration at the offices of another board.
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permitted attacks by university students and faculty members on
speaker ban laws and similar regulations,2 0 and by public employ-
ees on loyalty oaths, even before sanctions had been invoked
against them.28 1
In Boyle v. Landry,28 2 the Supreme Court did not alter this broad-
ened test for "irreparable injury" and standing previously recog-
nized in Dombrowski-type suits; it merely held that an allegation of
chilling effect due to facial invalidity, without more, was insufficient
to show "irreparable injury." The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals made this very same point in National Student Association
v. Hershey,28 3 while discussing justiciability. Boyle merely applied
the same rationale to "irreparable injury"; nothing in the case af-
fects the decisions in such cases as Hershey which hold a demon-
strable chilling effect sufficient to satisfy the requirements of "ir-
reparable injury" and of standing necessary for affirmative relief
based on statutory facial invalidity.284 Therefore, it should be as-
sumed that the Hershey test of "credible threat of enforcement
and plausible allegations of intent or desire to engage in the
threatened activities ' 28 5 continues in effect in Dombrowski-type
suits seeking relief against future enforcement.
Dombrowski itself involved both elements relevant to a claim for
relief against future enforcement: (1) fast prosecutions under al-
legedly unconstitutional laws; and (2) a specific threat of future
prosecutions. 28 6  Past arrests were recognized in a number of pre-
Younger-and here pre-Landry-cases. 287 In Parker v. Morgan,288
280. See, e.g., Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969);
Smith v. University of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
281. Standing in these circumstances had been recognized prior to Dom-
browski. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
282. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
283. 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
284. In Younger the intervening plaintiffs alleged that the prosecution
per se of Younger would have a chilling effect on their first amendment
activities. This, of course, was insufficient to establish "irreparable in-
jury." See also Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1971), where individuals and
groups who alleged that the Army's civilian surveillance activities created
a chilling effect upon their exercise of first amendment rights were held to'
have presented a justiciable controversy which entitled them to an evi-
dentiary hearing.
285. 412 F.2d at 1111-12.
286. See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), where there were
past arrests, but no threat of future enforcement. The Court held that
this might be sufficient to support a claim for declaratory relief, even if
insufficient to support one for injunctive relief. By the time the case came
up again the Court found it moot. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
287. See, e.g., Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Kirk-
wood v. Ellington, 298 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); University Comm.
to End the War in Vietnam v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 383 (1970); Hunter v. Allen, 286 F. Supp. 830
(N.D. Ga. 1968).
288. 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
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for instance, the plaintiffs had been prosecuted under a state flag
desecration statute.28 9 Finding federal jurisdiction, the three-judge
court replied:
Clearly the plaintiffs have standing to prosecute the suit.
The state through its two solicitors joined as parties de-
fendant admits a duty to enforce the statute and the inten-
tion to do so. Obviously Parker and Berg may reasonably
apprehend further arrest and prosecution. Indeed the evi-
dence tends to show that Parker, because of his apprehen-
sion, has discontinued wearing his flag jacket. We think
these plaintiffs have a sufficient personal stake in the out-
come of this lawsuit. . . and that the dispute is a genuinely
adversary one susceptible to judicial resolution.2 90
Similarly, in the post-Younger case, Taylor v. City of Selma,291 the
court found bad faith prosecution and enjoined a pending prosecu-
tion under the Alabama antiriot statute. Also, at the request of
the plaintiffs, who had brought the suit as a class action, it enjoined
future prosecutions as well.
On the other hand, in Fuller v. Scott,292 the court apparently
reached a contrary result. After the plaintiffs were prosecuted
under the North Carolina antiriot act, they immediately instituted
the Dombrowski-type suit. In a pre-Younger decision, the federal
court issued a declaratory judgment that certain portions of the act
were unconstitutional. Thereafter, the state prosecutions were ter-
minated in their favor.293 The federal court however then adopted
the view that federal intervention was improper in light of Younger
and Samuels and vacated its declaratory judgment. The court fur-
ther refused to grant relief against future enforcement on the
ground that the plaintiffs had neither been arrested, nor even
threatened since the date of the original charges. In contrast, in
Parker, law enforcement officials had stated that they intended to
enforce the flag desecration statute if the plaintiffs, or anyone else,
wore flag jackets. Assuming this admission to constitute a "credi-
ble threat of enforcement," the two cases are distinguishable:.
Where the plaintiffs have been prosecuted under a particular law,
and they plan to continue their activities in circumstances which
make it likely that the law will be enforced against them again,
there is both a "credible threat of enforcement and a desire to en-
gage in the threatened activities." Relief against future enforce-
ment should be available.
Where the plaintiffs have not been prosecuted, but where their
activities are clearly subject to the law in question, and they seek
289. One plaintiff had been convicted, while the other was acquitted.
290. 322 F. Supp. at 587.
291. 327 F. Supp 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
292. 328 F. Supp. 842 (M.D.N.C. 1971).
293. An extremely broad injunction was also dissolved at the same time.
I
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to carry on their activities free from its restrictions, established
principles of "irreparable injury" and standing entitle them to seek
a declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality and to enjoin its
enforcement. 294 A union organizer, for example, may challenge a
law requiring a permit for solicitation of union membership even
though he has not been prosecuted for its violation.295  Since the
chilling effect on protected activity is a realistic one, the general
principle is that the Constitution does not require litigants to be
subjected to the possible harm of a criminal prosecution "before
seeking relief from an allegedly unconstitutional statute when ac-
tual interference with protected rights is shown. ' 296 Thus, persons
expressly subject to laws that regulate first amendment activities
can properly institute a Dombrowski-type suit before the laws have
been invoked against them. In Gall v. Lawler,291 for example, the
plaintiff was associated with an underground newspaper, the sell-
ing of which by another had resulted in prosecution for selling news-
papers without a license. Since the plaintiff was clearly subject to
the law in question, he was able to seek relief against its enforce-
ment.29
8
The same result was reached in a post-Younger case, Hull v. Pe-
trillo,299 involving a similar situation. A city ordinance requiring a
peddler's license was applied to the sale of The Black Panther, the
newspaper of the Black Panther Party. After a successful prosecu-
tion had been brought against a party member for violation of the
ordinance, the plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of the ordinance
was part of a scheme of harassment "for the purpose of driving both
the newspaper and the Black Panther Party itself out of the city. '30 0
The police then disclaimed any intention to use the ordinance
against the Panthers again, admitting that it could not constitu-
tionally be applied to the sale of newspapers.3 0 1 However, the
court, citing Dombrowski, observed that so long as the law re-
mained available to the state, the threat of prosecution was real.
Holding the plaintiffs' allegations, if true, sufficient to justify fed-
eral intervention and relief against future enforcement of the law,
the court provided several interesting observations:
[A] lthough the alleged harrassment of plaintiffs in this case
is not nearly as pronounced as in Dombrowski, the dif-
294. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
295. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492
(4th Cir. 1967).
296. Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 838 (6th Cir. 1971).
297. 322 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
298. The city had hauled out a peddler, solicitor, and transient merchant
licensing law and applied it to an activity for which it obviously was
never intended. The selective enforcement involved here was undoubtedly
evident to the court.
299. 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971).
300. Id. at 1185.
301. Id. at 1186. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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ference in the degree of subtlety of the two campaigns may
be primarily a function of their different locales. The same
unconstitutional end may be accomplished by a protracted
plan of subtle harassment as well as by blatant threats of
improper legal action, and one ultimately may have no less
of a chilling effect than the other. Without a definitivejudicial interpretation denying the legality of its applicabil-
ity to sale of plaintiffs' newspaper, the ordinance remains
a potential tool in a campaign of harassment against the
Black Panther Party, a campaign in which plaintiffs have
alleged its use as such a tool is a reality. 0 2
The court referred to the Younger cases only in a footnote, finding
them inapplicable: "in the absence of federal relief, the chilling
effect upon the First Amendment rights of vendors of the Black
Panther newspaper-a chilling that is not merely speculative but
arises out of specific official actions directed against these plaintiffs
-will continue unchecked. '30 3 The fact that the plaintiffs' activity
had been held subject to the law, coupled with allegations of harass-
ment and with the practical realities of the situation-the Black
Panthers are not exactly popular with city officials anywhere-
justified the finding of specific chilling effect.30 4
A more difficult situation is presented where the plaintiffs' ac-
tivities are not expressly covered by the law in question and they
have not been prosecuted under it.3 0  Here the concept of specific
chilling effect and the nexus criteria of standing become signifi-
cant. Most laws which can be used as instruments of repression are
directed toward conduct, rather than toward categories of persons,
groups, or activities. The existence of these laws constitutes a
potent weapon in the hands of government officials, who can en-
force them against any person or group engaged in dissent and so-
cial change effort. This is particularly true when the laws are
vague and overbroad; threats to enforce such laws can have a very
real chilling effect on social change effort and protest activity.
Prior to Younger, it was often permissible, and indeed tactically
sound, to wait until those laws were actually invoked.30 6 But with
the elimination of the "void on its face" basis of attack, it may be
necessary to take affirmative action to remove these potentially
302. 439 F.2d at 1187.
303. Id. at 1186-87 n.1. See also Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d
Cir. 1970), where the court concluded that the problem no longer existed.
304. For post-Younger cases granting relief against future enforcement
of obscenity-type laws, see National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. Motion
Picture Comm'n, 328 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Wis. 1971); LaRue v. State, 326 F.
Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
305. In Hershey, the directive had been invoked against the activities of
the plaintiffs. Affidavits had been introduced showing that draft boards
had begun to reclassify protestors pursuant to its provisions.
306. There would then assuredly be a concrete case, and the nature of
the repression would appear more clearly. Also, the filing of the suit
would represent a counterattack.
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repressive weapons prior to their actual invocation. When a "cred-
ible threat of enforcement" has been made, it should be possible to
find a specific chilling effect on the dissent and social change effort
toward which the threat is directed. The persons engaged in that
effort will feel the brunt of the chill and, therefore, can show harm
to their protected first amendment rights. There is likewise a
nexus between their status and the challenge made: as persons
engaged in social change effort, they are challenging laws that
have been threatened to be enforced against that effort, as a re-
sult of which it may suffer a specific chilling effect.
A clear case of specific chilling effect was presented in Long Is-
land Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,30 7 where the prose-
cuting attorney of Nassau County, New York, announced at a press
conference that he would enforce the state's flag desecration stat-
ute against anyone displaying a representation of the American flag
on which the peace symbol was superimposed. He alluded spe-
cifically to a decal and button circulated by the plaintiff organiza-
tion as violative of the statute. A federal suit was immediately
filed. The court did not question the standing of the organization,
but as a result of the prosecutor's statements, it would have come
within the "expressly-covered-by-the-statute" test. In the context
of holding abstention improper, the court also observed that a num-
ber of persons had been arrested for displaying the emblem dis-
tributed by the organization.30 8 The court then held the statute
unconstitutional.
I would analyze the case as follows. The status of the plaintiff,
as an organization distributing a decal containing both a flag
and a peace symbol, gave it standing to assert a claim that the flag
desecration statute was unconstitutional. The public statement of
the prosecutor indicating an intent to enforce the law against anti-
war advocates who conjoined the flag with the peace symbol could
certainly have a specific chilling effect upon such activity, so as to
satisfy the requirement of "irreparable injury" and entitle them to
equitable relief. In other words, public threats to enforce a law
against designated classes of persons makes the chilling effect real
as to them, rather than merely hypothetical.3 0 9 Given the tendency
of public officials to make "political announcements" of their inten-
tion to enforce repressive laws, a "credible threat of enforcement"
307. 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970).
308. Id. at 347. Quoting the district judge, the court commented: "[O3ur
citizens are entitled not to be threatened with prosecution because of a
particular interpretation given to a somewhat ambiguous statute by a
prosecutor whose views on public issues may differ from others."
309. Thus, the Supreme Court's remark in Boyle is most significant:
"[T]he complaint contains no mention of any specific threat by any
officer or official of Chicago, Cook County, or the State of Illinois to arrest
or prosecute any one or more of the plaintiffs under that statute either
one time or many times. 401 U.S. at 81.
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can often be found, and then all that remains is that a person with
standing challenge the law in question.
The same rationale was applied in the post-Younger case of An-
derson v. Vaughn310 involving an affirmative action to declare in-
valid the Connecticut "red flag" statute.3 1 1 The status of the plain-
tiffs was not discussed, but apparently they were part of a group
that publicly displayed Viet Cong flags near "a state-wide gather-
ing where the President of the United States was present. ' 312 Al-
though some members of that group had been arrested, the par-
ticular plaintiffs had not been. Since no prosecutions were pending
against the plaintiffs and the class they purported to represent,
the court held Younger inapplicable.313 The court was then willing
to find that a justiciable controversy existed,3 1 4 since recent arrests
had been made under the statute, and since law enforcement offi-
cials had indicated their intention to enforce the statute in the fu-
ture:
In these circumstances we are of the view that the plain-
tiffs ought not be forced to violate a law affecting their
First Amendment rights and subject themselves to criminal
prosecution in order to place the issue before a judicial
forum. Forced exposure to criminal sanctions in order to
test the validity of statutory limitations of First Amend-
ment rights is irreparable injury of sufficient dimension
to justify federal declaratory relief.3 1 5
The Court then held the statute invalid on its face.
The following strategy is therefore suggested: after a repressive
law has been invoked, apart from whether a Dombrowski-type suit
is brought to enjoin the pending prosecution, a suit should be filed
to enjoin future enforcement by an "appropriate plaintiff"-for
example, an individual or organization engaged in the type of activ-
ity forming the basis for the prosecution. Commencement of the
prosecution should constitute a "credible threat of enforcement" and
thus demonstrate that the chilling effect is real rather than hypo-
thetical.31 6
However, the court appeared to reach a contrary conclusion in
Hendricks v. Hogan317 a case involving a challenge to a flag dese-
310. 327 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1971).
311. Ch. 35, [1919] Conn. Laws 2703 (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1971).
312. 327 F. Supp. at 105 (dissenting opinion).
313. Id. at 102.
314. The court treated this as an article III question. As we have said
earlier, the question also involves standing and "irreparable injury."
315. 327 F. Supp. at 103. The court assumed that the Connecticut au-
thorities would now refuse to enforce the statute and dissolved a tem-
porary restraining order previously issued.
316. This is to be contrasted with the situation where bringing the prose-
cution indicates that the plaintiff's activities are "expressly covered" by
the law.
317. 324 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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cration law which arose out of an art exhibition featuring "various
uses or representations of the national flag. '318 Three of the
plaintiffs had been charged with violation of the statute for "ex-
hibiting . . . [the United States] flag in open view so as to resemble
in shape a human penis, and draped from a toilet bowl .... -319
The others were artists, many of whom exhibited at the show. As
discussed earlier, 320 the district court refused to enjoin the pending
prosecution and, without extended discussion, dismissed the claims
of the remaining plaintiffs, observing that they had been neither
arrested nor threatened with arrest under the statute.3 21
This analysis ignores the fact that there was a "credible threat
of enforcement," as evidenced by the prosecution of the other plain-
tiffs, and that the unprosecuted plaintiffs would be unable to carry
on their activities without fear of prosecution. These facts should
demonstrate a specific chilling effect, and the plaintiffs, as mem-
bers of the group toward which enforcement was directed, were ap-
propriate parties to challenge the law's constitutionality. The result
in Hendricks does suggest that it is strategically unwise to join as
plaintiff a person already being prosecuted. Rather, it might be
desirable to bring an entirely separate action against future enforce-
ment, so as to focus more clearly on the standing of the particular
plaintiffs and the chilling effect that the threat of enforcement has
produced on their activities. At least the court will not be able
to approach the case with the "Younger set"-no relief unless bad
faith prosecution is shown.3 22
In Lewis v. Kugler,323 the New Jersey "long-haired travellers"
case discussed earlier, the lower court refused to enjoin the prose-
cutions of those arrested and also denied relief to the plaintiffs who
had not been arrested. As to the latter, the court held that they
had not shown any ground for relief based on "allegations of an-
ticipated future activities by the New Jersey State Police,"324
and expressly stated that, "where a number of plaintiffs are joined
some of whom have criminal prosecutions pending against them and
some of whom do not, the non-intervention principle enunciated in
318. Id. at 1279.
319. Id. at 1280.
320. See notes 247-250 supra and accompanying text.
321. A challenge was also made to the federal flag desecration statute,
18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1970). The court held that the existence of the statute
and an affidavit from the United States Attorney to the effect that he would
execute the duties of his office was insufficient to justify consideration of
the claim. One of the plaintiffs, Abbie Hoffman, had been prosecuted un-
der that statute in the District of Columbia, and the court held that his
claims could be determined in that action. For final resolution of that
case, see Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
322. See note 84 supra.
323. 324 F. Supp. 1220 (1971).
324. Id. at 1223.
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Younger applies. '325 However, this rationale is a sort of judicial
"Catch 22": if you have not been prosecuted, you have not shown
any injury; but as soon as you are prosecuted, Younger comes into
play. Either way, federal relief is precluded. Reversing this
portion of the opinion, the Third Circuit emphasized that the
Younger decisions were applicable only to pending state prosecu-
tions and that, "they do not alter the abstention doctrine insofar
as it relates to federal Civil Rights Act claims which do not seek
relief that entails intervention in state criminal proceedings. '32 It
assumed the standing of the plaintiffs to challenge the policy ap-
plicable to a class of persons of which they were a member and
stated that if the plaintiffs could establish that they had been sub-
ject to a "deliberate pattern and practice of constitutional viola-
tions by the New Jersey State Troopers, '327 they would be entitled
to injunctive relief. The case was remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.32 8
In summary, Younger did not deal directly with the matter of
relief against threatened prosecutions and future law enforcement;
moreover, Boyle merely held that an allegation of chilling effect
due to facial invalidity is insufficient. It is doubtful that the pre-
Younger cases involving relief against future enforcement (as op-
posed to relief against pending prosecutions) were based solely on
the hypothetical chilling effect due to the existence of facially in-
valid laws. The particular plaintiffs seeking relief were generally
persons who had been prosecuted under the law challenged, were
engaged in activities clearly covered by the law, or were members
of a class against whom the law had been invoked. Thus, there
generally had been past prosecutions under the law or other
"credible threats of enforcement." Post-Younger cases have sim-
ilarly allowed challenges on these bases. In suits to enjoin future
enforcement, plaintiffs should therefore focus on: (1) the specific
chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights by the
plaintiffs because of past prosecutions or credible threats of en-
forcement; and (2) their standing by virtue of their status as pro-
testers to challenge the validity of the law in question. Since
Younger restricts the availability of relief against pending prosecu-
tions, affirmative action to enjoin future enforcement or to obtain
declarations of unconstitutionality now becomes particularly signif-
icant.
325. Id.
326. Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1347 (3d Cir. 1971).
327. Id. at 1350.
328. The district court was advised that it could consider the merits of
the constitutional claims of those who were being prosecuted as a part of
its consideration of all of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs to prove a
pattern and practice of unlawful police misconduct, but that it should not
enter a judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the particular
searches forming the basis of the state's prosecution. Id. at 1349.
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VI. THE DOMBROWSKI-TYPE SUIT AFTER YOUNGER:
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Utilization of the Dombrowski-type suit as a weapon against re-
pression must also be related to the broader question of manipu-
lating the legal system in order to protect dissent and social change
effort.3 29 I return now to the inherent paradox suggested earlier
in this article: legal protection of dissent and social change effort
must come from persons-judges-who are themselves integral com-
ponents of the very "system" toward which that effort is directed.
330
As part of the "Establishment, '33 1 judges are likely to be essen-
tially satisfied with the status quo and resistant to fundamental
political, economic, and social change.
Assuming then that judicial protection of dissent and social
change effort against governmental repression can not be taken for
granted, it is essential to adopt a strategy which will maximize the
likelihood of protection. My contention is that this effect is best
achieved by forcing the judge to face the contradiction between
theory and reality-between the assumption that the first amend-
ment does guarantee the freedom to dissent and work for social
change and the brutal fact that governmental repression is indeed
rained on social change advocates. This strategy recognizes not
only that judges have the motivation--conscious or unconscious-
to deny protection, but also that they feel duty bound to uphold the
Constitution. If protection of social change effort is to be forth-
coming, I submit that it will, to a great extent, occur because in-
stitutional constraints on judges, and their own role perceptions, are
capable of overcoming human predilections.
An important political consideration, therefore, is the relationship
between utilization of the Dombrowski-type suit-both in general
and in the context of a particular case-to manipulation of the sys-
tem in order to protect dissent and social change effort. Is the suit,
for example, a good vehicle in the particular case for forcing the
judge to face up to the contradictions? For instance, if social ac-
tivists desire to challenge a law as facially invalid in a case involving
"hard core" conduct, it is much easier for the judge to rationalize
a decision denying protection, than it is in a case involving "pure
speech" clearly entitled to first amendment protection. Under some
circumstances this may dictate foregoing the suit in the former
case, especially since the "void on its face" aspect of Dombrowski
has now been removed. Under others, political considerations may
nevertheless make the filing of a Dombrowski-type suit necessary.
The point is that the likelihood of legal failure is a relevant political
consideration to take into account; each case must be assessed in
329. See Sedler, supra note 37, at 1079-83.
330. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
331. See note 50 supra.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
terms of its relation to the overall effort against repression.3 32
Second, part of the current "judicial ethos" is the belief-
whether or not justified-that Dombrowski-type suits and "civil
rights" cases generally are being brought with such frequency as
to "burden" the courts. Recognizing that the judges are essen-
tially satisfied with the status quo and are resistant to fundamental
social change, it is not difficult to understand why this attitude
exists.33 3 But if resort to the courts is to be had in the effort to
resist repression, and if the "system" is to be manipulated in order
to protect dissent and social change effort, this ethos must be
taken into account. I believe that judicial levels of consciousness
will be raised best at this juncture by the filing of "appealing"
Dombrowski-type suits, which cogently and dramatically illuminate
the very real nature of the repression occurring. In a suit where
clearly protected conduct is involved and where a repressive pur-
pose can be easily demonstrated,3 3 4 the judges can be forced to
face up to the contradictions and to see the necessity for federal
intervention. Favorable precedents can be established and judi-
cial levels of consciousness can be raised.
Obviously an argument could be made for a completely different
kind of strategy. It could be contended that the best strategy is
to force the courts to confront the issue in case after case so
that the Supreme Court will ultimately be faced with the choice of
broadening the availability of the Dombrowski-type remedy or
eliminating it completely by holding section 2283 a bar to relief
against all pending prosecutions. My own feeling at this time-
engendered only in part by the Supreme Court's changing composi-
tion 33 3 -is that if the federal courts are faced with a multitude of
Dombrowski-type suits, including those involving "hard core" con-
duct, the Supreme Court will come down on the wrong side of the
question. Perhaps there are political advantages in such a re-
sult, but since I see the availability of the Dombrowski-type suit as
having a significant political utility, even after Younger, I have a
hard time imagining what they would be.3 36
332. It is important, particularly in the struggle against repression, that
various components of the "movement for social change" consider how
particular actions will affect the overall effort.
333. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). As stated
previously, McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967), was also
a good example. The cases involving attempts to suppress newspapers by
obviously unconstitutional applications of licensing laws (Hull v. Petrillo,
439 F.2d 1184 [2d Cir. 1971]; Gall v. Lawler, 322 F. Supp. 1223 [E.D. Wis.
1971] ), are still another.
335. Only Justice Douglas dissented in Younger and Boyle, and he con-
curred in Samuels.
336. I generally disagree with the "holocaust" theory of achieving social
change. For an effective refutation of the "holocaust" theory in the
political context, see Kinoy, supra note 36, at 9-10.
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I can only reemphasize what I believe to be the importance of
picking the right cases. Perhaps a certain priority should be given
to seeking relief against future enforcement of unconstitutional laws
or governmental action, thereby not only avoiding the legal problem
of Younger, but the "federal courts don't intervene in state criminal
prosecutions" syndrome as well.3 37 On the other hand, where crim-
inal prosecutions are pending, the decision to bring a Dombrowski-
type suit must be approached from the "political-legal" perspective.
It should ordinarily be determined whether there are independent
political advantages in bringing a Dombrowski-type suit, rather
than in simply defending the state prosecution. 338 Even if the po-
litical advantage is apparent, the likelihood of success in establish-
ing bad faith prosecution or the other bases of "irreparable injury"
should be taken into account, as well as the suitability of the case as
a vehicle for forcing the court to face up to the need to protect
dissent and social change effort from repressive governmental ac-
tion. Naturally, if a case is particularly strong because the activity
in question is clearly protected conduct and the repression obvious,
this itself may constitute an important political consideration mili-
tating in favor of beginning the Dombrowski-type suit.
One final point, concerning use of three-judge courts, 339 need be
mentioned. In the Dombrowski-type suit, where injunctive relief
is sought against the enforcement of state laws on the ground of
unconstitutionality, the plaintiffs are necessarily entitled to a
three-judge court. In some areas, this may be advantageous be-
cause the local district judge is unsympathetic to the problem of
protecting dissent and social change effort. Also, direct appeal to
the Supreme Court will be available if injunctive relief is denied
by the three-judge court.3 40  While this shortened route has, in
the past, met with the favor of movement lawyers, it may be essen-
tial to reconsider the virtue of such appeals; if present trends con-
tinue, the Supreme Court may become more "conservative" than
will a number of courts of appeals.
Further, the three-judge requirement is universally unpopular
with the federal judiciary, and in the Dombrowski context, com-
pounds the "burden" such suits place on the courts. This judicial
distaste tempts many district judges, to whom the application for
convening a three-judge court must be addressed, to deny the appli-
cation on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction or that the
federal question is insubstantial.341 This denial requires an appeal
337. And of course, the section 2283 problem is also avoided.
338. It may be necessary to pay more attention to "manipulating the
system" in the state courts and to consider how judicial behavior can be
influenced in that setting. This will not be an easy task.
339. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 50.
340. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
341. Regarding the criteria for dismissals by the single judge, see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 191-92.
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to the court of appeals, which means further delay, and assuming
that the district judge is reversed,3 42 the plaintiffs are no further
along than they should have been at the outset of the action. More
significantly, the right of direct appeal again creates problems. If
the Supreme Court does not want to hear the particular case it may
grant a motion to affirm.3 43 Such an affirmance can not only set
an unfavorable precedent, but also will permit the effective deci-
sion to be made by the three-judge lower court, without ever being
meaningfully considered by an appellate court.
Hence, the three-judge court act, originally designed for the pro-
tection of state officials,3 44 and which in practice has worked to
the benefit of the plaintiff seeking to enjoin allegedly unconstitu-
tional state action, 345 may no longer provide the advantages that
plaintiffs once thought it offered. At least this may be true in
particular areas, depending on the experience with three-judge
courts and the relative "sympathy" on the part of district judges
and the appropriate court of appeals. Where the benefits of a
three-judge court are questionable, consideration should be given
to structuring the case in such a way as to permit it to be heard
by a single judge. This will likely not be difficult, as a practical
matter, given the hostility to convening three-judge courts and
the fact that the three-judge court act is not "a measure of broad
social policy to be construed with great liberality, but . . . an enact-
ment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied
as such. '340  Framing the case as one for a single judge, then, in-
sures that the effective decision will be made by the court of ap-
peals, with possible review in the Supreme Court on certiorari.
In cases seeking relief against future enforcement, the three-
judge court can be avoided by limiting the claim to declaratory re-
lief. As a practical matter, this is the only relief that the courts
have been generally giving when declaring laws "void on their
face. '3 4 7  Or, where injunctive relief is sought against pending
prosecutions on the basis of bad faith enforcement, it could be ar-
gued that the relief sought is against governmental action, rather
than against the operation of the statute as such. The case would
342. Not infrequently the district judge will reach the merits in the
process of finding "insubstantiality," and reversals for this reason are al-
most as frequent. In a number of cases the claim that the district judge
found to be "insubstantial" was ultimately decided in the plaintiff's favor.
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163 (1964).
343. There is a serious question whether the Supreme Court treats ap-
peals, including those from three-judge courts, all that differently from
the way it treats petitions for certiorari.
344. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 188-89.
345. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 255.
346. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
347. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 262.
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then be one in which "the constitutionality of a statute is drawn
in question without any prayer for the restraint of its enforce-
ment, ' 348 and a three-judge court would not be required. In fact,
in pre-Younger days, some three-judge courts held that the claim
of bad faith enforcement should be determined by the single judge
and therefore limited their consideration to the facial validity of
the statute.3 49 In any event, consideration should be given to the
utility of seeking a three-judge court, and in many cases it may be
to the plaintiff's advantage to avoid doing so.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article I have attempted to analyze the Dombrowski-
type suit in the wake of the Younger cases and to assess its present
significance from the remedial-political perspective. I still believe
that the availability of this remedy can go far to redress the balance
between those seeking social change and those using their control
of the apparatus of government to resist it. However, important
decisions must be made regarding its utilization today, so that it
can remain a potent weapon in the struggle for social change.
348. C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 190.
349. See, e.g., Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
